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Record No. 1892 
CITY OF LYNCHBURG 
ve·rsus 
CHESAPEAICE AND OHIO RAILvVAY COMPANY. 
PETITION FOR APPEAL. 
To the Honorable Justices of the Supreme Court of Appeals 
of Virginia: 
Your petitioner, the City of Lynchburg, a municipal cor-
poration, respectfully asks that an appeal may be granted to 
it from a decree ent€red by the Corporation Court for the 
City of Lynchburg on the 9th day of December, 1936, in a 
chancery cause in which your petitioner is plaintiff and the 
Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Company is defendant. 
The decree complained of sustained a demurrer of the de-
fendant to the bill of complaint and dismissed the bill. There 
is filed herewith a copy of the record in the lower court, and a 
copy of Exhibit 1 filed with the bill, which exhibit is a copy 
of a map of the City of Lynchburg, showing the various 
portions thereof served by different outlet sewers, including 
those emptying into the old James River and Kanawha Canal, 
now owned by the C. & 0. Railway Company. This map need 
not be printed, but will be referred to in original form in 
argument before the court. 
This case, as the case of John H. Heald Co., et als., v. the 
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Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Co1npany, recently decided by 
this Court, is a sequel to the case of the City of LynchJJurg, et 
als., v. Commonwealth, ex rel., C. <I; 0. Railway Company and 
Appalachian Electric Power Co1npany, decided by this court 
on March 14, 1935. The facts represented in this 'case~ how-
ever, and the claims of the City of Lynchburg v. the C~ ct 0. 
Railway Company are entirely different from those claims 
asserted on behalf· of John H. Heald and Company, et als., 
in the case recently before this court. An entirely different 
principle of law is involved in the instant case from the case 
last above referred to, though the effect of a decision in favor 
of the appellant might he the same, that is, to keep open the 
Lynchburg level of the J an1es River and l{anawha Canal. 
It will be unnecessary, in light of the familiarity of this 
court with many of the facts of the case because of the court's 
familiarity with the case decided by it on March 14, 1935, 
supra, on appeal from the decision of the State Corporation 
Commission, and with the Heald case recently decided, to go 
into great detail as to certain of the facts set out in the 
above case. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS. 
In 1840 the James River and Kanawha Canal was com-
pleted from Richmond to Lynchburg (R~cord, p. 3). This 
canal in the City of Lynchburg 'vas located, for the most part, 
some 100 to 200 yards frmn the bank of James River at the 
foot of the large hill or hills on which the City is located 
(Record, p. 3). This canal cut off the City of Lynchburg from 
access to the river for its sewer mains. Beginning at least 75 
years ago (R-ecord, p. 4) the City constructed its sewer 
mains, both storm and sanitary, to empty into this canal. The 
last sewer main emptying into the canal was constructed by 
the City more than 20 years ago. These sewers are nine in 
number, as shown on the map .filed as Exhibit 1, and they 
serve the main business and industrial section of the City 
and several residential sections. With the canal blocking ac-
cess of the City sewers from the river, unless the canal could 
be used for an outlet, the cost to the City of running these 
nine sewers under the canal, railroad tracks and industrial 
plants to the river would be so tremendous as to be pro-
hibitive (R~cord, p. 5). , 
By an act of the Legislature of Virginia, approved Feb-
ruary_27, 1879, the Jan1es River and Kanawha Company was 
authorized to convey all its properties, including the canal 
'· 
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at Lynchburg, to the Richmond and Alleghany Railroad Com-
pany, and by deed, dated March 4, 1880 (Exhibit 2 with the 
bill, Record, p. 20, et seq.), these properties were conveyed 
to the railroad company. By subsequent deeds (Exhibits 
3 and 4 with the bill) these properties passed to the C. & ·o. 
Railway Company, the present owner. The act of 1879, which 
act was set out in the deed to the Richmond and Alleghany 
Railroad Company in full, provided, among other things, as 
a part of the consideration for the conveyance, ''It shall 
be the duty of the Richmond and Alleghany Railroad Com-· 
pany to maintain the present water supply • • * of the canal 
* "' * along the Lynchburg level between the waterworks 
dam (which shall be preserved) above Lynchburg and the 
first lock below Lynchburg, and in the construction of its 
railroad it shall not so destroy or obstruct the present canal 
«· • • between the waterworks dam above Lynchburg and the 
first lock below Lynchburg as to lessen the present water 
supply" (Record, p. 9). · · 
Under this provision of said act, and the deed carrying 
it into effect, the canal has been kept open at the Lynchburg 
level up to the present time. In 1933 the Chesapeake and 
Ohio Railway Company and the Appalachian Electric Power 
Company petitioned the State Corporation Commission to 
close the canal at the Lynchburg level. On November 28, 
1933, the State Corporation Commission entered an order 
granting this privilege, so far as all public duties were con-
cerned, but expressly provided, ''That nothing in this order 
contained shall destroy or affect • • • any rights, if any, 
which the City of Lynchburg may have in, to, or over the 
said properties for the purposes of its existing sewer sys-
tem''. This order preserved such rights as the City may 
have to keep the canal open for the purpos~ of a sewer out-
let. 
The John H. Heald Company, ·the City of Lynchburg and 
other parties who had appeared in the case before the Cor-
poration Commission appealed this decision to this Honor-
able Court, and the order of the Corporation Commission was 
affirmed, with the right in the City of Lynchburg to take such 
steps as it might see fit to protect such rights as it had in 
the use of the canal as a sewer outlet. The City was advised, 
following the decision of this court on the appeal from the 
order of the State Corporation Commission, that the rail-
road company was and is planning to close and fill in the 
canal at the Lynchburg level, and thereby absolutely de-
stroy the City's outlets for its sewers (Record, p. 5). This 
suit was brought for the purpose of enjoining the closing 
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of the canal, and the destruction of the said sewer outlet. 
The facts are that for many years prior to 1879 the City 
had used the canal of necessity as an outlet for its sewers 
from the principal business and residential sections of the 
City. The defendant, in its demurrer and the lower court 
in its opinion, took the position that the duty imposed upon 
the Richmond-Alleghany Railroad Company by the Act of 
1879 to keep the canal open at the Lynchburg level, and not 
to lessen the water supply therein, was a public d~ty of some 
. sort which the State could waive, and having waived it through 
the action of the State Corporation Commission, the C. & 0. 
Railway Company, the present owner of the property, has 
a right to close the canal. It was with this conclusion, of 
course, that the City of Lynchburg is not in accord. 
The question involved-The City of Lynchburg in the 
present suit based its claim that the canal be kept open at 
the Lynchburg level perpetually as an outlet for the City's 
sewers on· the following grounds : 
(1). By the Act of 1879 authorizing the sale of the prop-
erty to the Richmond and Alleghany Railroad Company, it 
was provided as a part of the consideration which the Railroad 
Company was to pay for the properties acquired, that it 
must keep the canal open at the Lynchburg level perpetually, 
and not lessen the flow of water therein; and that the City 
acquired private rights under said Act in the maintenance 
of the canal. 
(2). That the City has acquired prescriptive rights to com-
pel the maintenance of the canal at the Lynchburg level, irre-
spective of the provisions of the Act of 1879. 
The decision of this court in the recent case of John H. 
Heald Co., Inc., et als., v. the Chesapeake and Ohio Railway 
Oompa;n,y, held that the only duties imposed by the Act of 
1879 were public duties, and that these had been declared 
at an end by the order of the State Corporation Commission 
entered on November 28, 1933. This being the decision of 
this court, the City must, of necessity, abandon the first 
ground of its claim, as above set forth, and rely upon the 
second ground, to: wit: that the City has required a pre-
scriptive right to have the canal maintained at the Lynch-
burg level for the purpose of furnishing it with an outlet 
for its sewers. 
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ARGUMENT. 
The Citv contends that it has acquired such a right. The 
general rule in Virginia· with reference to title by prescrip-
tion is well settled. 
I. General R~tle. 
Where a person has been enjoying certain incorporeal 
rights for at least twenty year.s, ~nd his enjoyment has 
been adverse, under a claim of right, exclusive, continuous, 
uninterrupted, with the knowledge and acquiescence of the 
owner of the estate in, over or out of which such rights pre-
scribed for are claimed, a prirna facie presumption is raised 
that such person has acquired prescriptive title to such rights. 
2 Minor Real Property, §983, et seq., Gaines v. Merryman, 
95 Va. 660 (1898); Reid v. ·Garnett, 101 Va. 47 (1903); Terry 
v. McL~tng, 104 Va. 599 (1905); Totten v. Stuart, 143 Va. 201 
(1925). See also other Virginia cases cited in Totten v. 
St'ltart, supra. 
The City's enjoyment of the right to empty its sewers 
into the canal, and use the canal as a perpetual outlet for 
the same meets every requirement necessary to obtain a 
prescriptive title. We shall discuss these elements separately. 
A. The right has been exercised by the City for over twenty 
years. There is no reason for any protracted discussion of 
this phase of the case. The rights have been enjoyed by the 
City for at least seventv-:five years prior to the institution 
of this suit. ., 
B. The right has been exercised by the City continuously 
and without interruptio'l~. There can be no valid argument 
on this point. In 2 Minor R.eal Property, 2d. Ed., §990, it 
is said: 
''Thus, it is well settled that the adverse user must be 
co'l~tinuous and 'li/Yl.interrupted throughout the prescriptive 
period. This does not mean that the user must necessarily 
continue every moment of the time, day in and day out, but 
that it should be of such frequency and continuity as to 
give reasonable notice to the landowner that the right is 
being exercised against him. For instance, a right of way 
may be acquired by prescription if the right is exercised at 
the pleasure of the adverse claimant, though the exercise 
be only occasional.'' 
It would be difficult to imagine any situation in which 
- --, 
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an enjoyment of a right has been more continuous than in 
the instant case. It is a right which has been exercised 
''every moment of the time, day in and day out'',· and until 
recently no question has ever been .raised by any one of the 
owners concerning the right of the City to use the canal in 
this manner, no suit has been brought to enjoin the City from 
so using the canal, nor has any other action or suit been 
instituted against the City by reason thereof. Furthermore, 
there have been no protests against such use by any of the 
owners, nor has there been any other action . on the part of 
any of the successive owners of the canal which would effect 
a break in the continuity of the City's adverse user. Thus 
the user has been continuous, uninterrupted and unmolested. 
C. The City's enjoyment of the right was exclusive. The 
rule of exclusiveness of enjoyment is stated in 2 Minor Real 
Property ( 2d Ed.), §993, as follows : 
''Exclusiveness of Enjoyment. ' 
''Here also the principle is the same in the case of pre-
scription as in the case of adverse possession, namely, that 
the adverse user must be exclusive, but the application is some-
what different; for the prescriptive right claimed is merely 
the right to use, not to occupy, the owner's land, and it is by 
no means necessarily inconsistent with the exclusiveness of 
the claimant's use of the land, that others also claim the right 
to use it, or that the owner uses it in the same way, provided 
the claimant's user is based upon a claim of right independent. 
of the others. 
''Thus, where one claims a right of way by prescription 
over another's land, the fact that there is a road or path 
over which he goes, and that such road or path is used by 
others or by the owner, as well as by himself, does not 
prevent him from acquiring the right by prescription to pass 
over the way; nor is his acquisition of such right in the 
least inconsistent with a like acquisition by others, either 
by grant or prescription, the right of each being exclusive of 
the rights of the others. 
"On the other hand, the use of another's land, in common 
with the rest <:lf the community or 'vith a certain class, and 
under no individual claim of right, does not give the claim-
ant a prescriptive right to such user. This is generally true 
because of the promiscuous character of the user, there being 
no individual claim of right. If such user was not merely 
permissive, but was part of a continued adverse use by the 
general public, then the right of the used may be acquired 
not by the individual claimant as such, but by the public in 
· general under the doctrine of dedication.'' 
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The Court defined the expression in Totten v. Stuart, 143 
Va. 201 (1925) thus (p. 203): 
. 
. ''The use is 'exclusive' when it is proprietary, not a use 
by the public generally, and is exercised under some claim 
which. is independent of and does not depend for enjoyment 
upon similar rights of others. It is not necessary, how-
ever, that the claimant be the only one to enjoy the right 
of way, as other persons may acquire a prescriptive right 
to use it ~ ~ • . " 
It is clear· that the use by th.e City was exclusive as the 
term is defined by the Courts. While it is true that other 
persons might have used the canal for similar or other pur-
poses, yet it could not be argued plausibly that the City shared 
this use in common with the rest of the community. It is cer-
tainly not used in- this manner by the public generally. The 
City's claim is independent of, and does not depend for en-
joyment upon, similar rights of others. In this case the 
City's sewers which empty into the canal are separate and 
distinct from those of any other person 'vhich flow into the 
canal. 
D. The City's enjoymen,t was with the knowledge and ac-
quiescence of the owner. 
There is no question but that the o'vners of the canal knew 
of the use to which it was being put by the City. The use 
was open, notorious and visible. · 
There is also no question but that the use was with the 
acquiescence of the owner. By acquiescence is meant failure 
on the part of the owner to object, Davis v. Wilkinson, 140 
Va. 672 (1924), and as heretofore stated the owners of the 
canal for more than seventy-five years have failed to make 
any objection to this use of the canal by the City. 
E. The City's enjoyment was adverse, under a claim of right. 
It is well settled that a permissive use will never ripen into 
title by prescription. Kent v. Dobya., 112 Va. 586 (1911); 
Witt v. Creasy1 117 Va. 873 (1915). But where the other 
elements of prescription are present, and there is no evidence 
introduced as to how the use originated, such use will be 
presumed to be under a claim of right and adverse. On this 
point the following language from 44 L. R. A. (N. S.) 98 
was quoted with approval by the ,Virginia Court of Appeals 
in Totten v. Stu.a.rt, s1t1J1·a, and in Davis v. Wilkinson, supra 
(p. 204): 
'' ' '"' • • Where there has been an open, visible, continuous 
and unmolested use of the land by another for a period of 
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time analogous to that prescribed by the statute of limitations 
as sufficient to acquire title by adverse possession, the use will 
be presumed to be under a claim of right, so as to place upon 
the owner of the servient estate, in order to avoid the ac-
quisition of an easement by prescription, the burden of re-
butting this presumption by showing that the use was per-
missive, and not under claim of right.' '' 
In 1Villiams v. Green, 111 Va. 205 (1910), the question in-
volved was whether the appellant was entitled to a ·private 
way over the lands of the appellee. There was no evidence 
introduced as to the manner in which the use originated. 
Under these circumstances the Court held that there was a 
presumption of a right or grant from the long aequiescence 
of the pa.rty upon whose land the way was. The following 
is from the opinion of the Court in this case (p. 206) : 
"While the appellee claims that the appellant's use of the 
way was permissive or by lic~nse merely, there is no evidence 
of that fact, nor is there any evidence as to the manner in 
which the use originated. The appellant's witnesses (the 
appellee introduced none) all testify to the uninterrupted 
use of the way by the appellant and her predecessors in title 
for more than forty years, and that the appellant and her 
family have uninterruptedly and continuously (that is, when-
ever they desired to use it as they had no other practicable 
way to a public road) used the way for more than twenty 
years. 
"Where a way has been thus used, openly, uninterruptedly, 
continuously and exclusively for a period of more than twenty 
years, the origin of the way not being shown, there is a 
presumption of ·a right or grant from the long acquiescence 
of the party upon whose land the way is. This presumption 
of a grant or adverse right is with us printa facie merely, 
and may be rebutted. Nickols v. Ayler, 5 Leigh 546; Field 
v. Brown, 24 Gratt. 74; Reid v. Garnett, 101 Va. 47, 43 S. E. 
182. 0 
' ' 'In the absence of evidence,' as was said by the Supreme 
Court of the State of Pennsylvania. in Worall v. Rhoads, 
2 Wharton 427, 30 Am. Dec. 27 4, 'tending to show that such 
long continued use of the way may be referred to a license, 
or special indulgence, that is either revocable or terminable, 
the conclusion is that it has grown out of a grant by the owner 
of the land and has been exercised under a titl-e thus derived. 
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The law favors this conclusion, because it will not presume 
any man's act illegal. It is reasonable to suppose that the 
owner of the land would not have acquiesced in such enjoy-
ment for a long period when it was to his interest to have 
interrupted it, unless he felt confident that the party enjoying 
it had a right and title to it that could not be defeated. And 
besides, seeing that it can work no prejudice to anyone ex-
cepting to him who has bee:Q. guilty of a great negligence, to 
say the least of it, public policy and convenience require that 
this presumption should be made, in order to promote the 
public peace and quiet men in their possession.' 
''When there has been such a use for more than twenty 
years the bona fides of the claim of right is established, and 
the owner of the land over which the way passes must rebut 
the presumption by showing permission or license from him 
or those under whom he claims, or denials or objections to 
such use made under circumstances that will rebut the pre.:. 
sumption. See Nickols v. Ayler, s~tpra; Field v. Brown, supra; 
Reid v. Ga·rnett, supra; Walton v. Knight, 62 W.Va. 223, 58 
S. E. 1025. 
"The continuous, uninterrupted and exclusive use of the 
private way by the appellant over the lands of the appellee 
having existed for a period of more than twenty years, there 
is a prima facie presumption of a. grant, and that such use 
was under a clai~ of right and adverse; and there being no 
evidence to rebut that presumption, the appellant's right 
to the private was established, and the trial court erred 
in not so holding." 
And in Davis v. Wilkinson, sup1·a, the Court, at page 677, 
specifically affirmed the doctrine laid down in Williams v. 
Green, and said : 
''In concluding the opinion in Willia;ms v. Green, supra, 
the court said: 'The continuous, uninterrupted and exclusive 
use of the private way by the appellant over the lands of 
the appellee having existed for a period of ·more than twenty 
years, there is a p·rima facie presumption of a grant, and that 
such use was under a claim of right and adverse; and there 
being no evidence to rebut that presumption, the appellant's 
right to the private way was established and the trial court 
erred in not so holding.' 
''These general principles above outlined have been recog-
nized by the later cases already cited.'' · 
In Trout v. Woodward, 114 N. E. 467 (Ind. App.) (1916), it 
was said: · _ · 
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''Where an easement is used by one whenever he sees 
proper, without asking permission, and no objection is made 
thereto, the use is adverse; and an adverse enjoyment and 
use uninterrupted for 20 years of an easement cannot be after-
wards disputed. Mitchell v. BOlin, 142 Ind. 604, 42 N. E. 230; 
Pyott v. State, 170 Ind. 118, 83 N. E. 737; Walley v. Wiley, 
56 Ind . .A.pp. 171, 104 N. E. 318; Seigmund v. Tyner, 52 Ind. 
App. 581, 101 N. E. 20. 
''In the latter case, it was said in considering the suffi-
cience of a~ answer that pleaded a right by prescription : 
" 'Its averments show that said drains were constructed 
and in use by and with the consent of all owners of s{lid lands 
long before appellant purchased his real estate; that he pur-
chased with full knowledge of the same and of appellee's 
easement, or right to flow water across his said lands. Under 
the authorities the answer states a good defense to appel-
lant's complaint.' 
''In Mitchell v. Bain, supra, the following language is made 
use of: 
" 'Such enjoyment, without explanation how it began, is 
presumed to have been in pursuance of a grant. The owner 
of the land has the burden of proving that the use of the ease-
ment was under some license, indulgence, or special contract, 
inconsistent with a claim of right by the other party.' 
"Construing the allegations of appellant's second para-
graph of complaint in the light of the authorities, it is clear, 
we think, that it is sufficient to withstand a demurrer for want 
of facts.'' 
In connection with adverse use, it is well settled that such 
use be such as would give rise to a right of action or of legal 
redress on the part of the owner of the servient estate. See 2 
Minor Id., §994, where it is said: 
''Adverse Character of the User. 
"Besides showing that the user was open, notorious, con-
tinuous and exclusive, it is also necessary to show that the 
user, during the entire prescriptive period, was hostile or ad-
verse to the true owner, which means that the circumstances 
of the particular case ~ust show that the user was not exer-
cised under his permission or liqense. 
''It is also essential, in order that the user may be adverse, 
that it be such as would give rise to a right of action or of 
legal redress on the part of the owner of the land, since other-
wise he would have no power legally to break the continuity of 
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the ~ser, and would be deprived of his rights without the 
power to prevent it. 
''Thus, the use of a public highway by an individual, though 
he use it for the prescriptive period, gives him no private 
right of way over the land, should the public way be aban-
doned or discontinued, for the owner could have brought no 
action against him to prevent his user, so long as the way is 
public. But should he continue the use after the highway is 
abandoned, he might the~, after the lapse of the prescriptive 
period, acquire a right thereto.'' 
. 
However, the use of the canal by the City as an outlet 
for its sewage is such as would have given rise to legal re-
dress at any time before the prescriptive period had run, 
because a City cannot discharge sewage on the property of 
another without acquiring the right to do so. On this point, 
see 43 C. J., page 1147, §1907: 
'' ( §1907) 11. Discharge of Sewage.-a. In General. A 
municipality may be held liable for discharging its sewage onto 
the land 9f an individual, or depositing sewage where it will 
percolate into and through the land of another, or flow on his 
land and pollute a water course thereon, unless it has in some 
lawful manner acquired the right to do so. So a municipality 
may not, without incurring liability, discharge or permit 
others to discharge sewage into an open ditch or other place 
near a residence where it will emit noxious ordors or gases 
and thereby impair the value of such property or render it 
uninhabitable. The continuance of a nuisance caused by the 
discharge of sewage may be enjoyed.'' . 
In Farnham, Waters .and Water Rights, '§101b, the author 
states: 
"101b. Other uses.-A canal being a trench or ditch filled 
with water which has a greater or less current according to 
the extent of its use is available for other uses than that of a 
waterway, and so far as such uses arc possible without inter .. 
fering with its proper purpose or creating a nuisance, there 
is no valid objection to them. But a municipal corporation 
cannot use a canal as an outlet for its sewers if the effect 
will be to fill up the ditch or create a nuisance. A grant is 
necessary to confer the righ~ to turn city sewers into a canal,. 
And any attempt on the part of a municipal corporation to 
turn its sewage into a canal without right will give the owner 
of the canal a right of action for damages, or a right to an 
injunction il • • • " (Italics supplied.) 
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In Locks and Canal v. Lowell, 7 Gray (73 Mass.) 223, it was 
held that a canal corporation may maintain an action of tort 
against a city, for discharging sewers and drains into the 
canal without acquiring or paying for the right to do so from 
either the corporation or state. 
In Chalkley v. Richmond, 88 Va. 402 (1891), it was held-that 
a sewer controlled by the city and so constructed that it causes 
water and filth to flow into a private person's cellar is a 
nuisance, and the city is liable for damages. 
And it was held in Portsntotdh v. Weiss, 145 Va. 94 (1926), 
that a municipal. corporation l1as no more right than a private 
individual to collect surface water from its property into an 
artificial channel and discharge it on the lands of another. 
The City's use of the canal for sewage purposes was, there-
f~re, clearly adverse. 
II. Kind of property or rights acquirable by prescription. 
~{ost of the cases from which we have quoted thus far have 
been cases where one person is claiming a private way over 
the land of another. Any incorporeal property or right may 
be acquired by prescription, and the same principles are ap-
plicable. 2 Minor Id., §§984, 986. In §986 it is said: 
"Nothing, then, but such things as lie in .. grant (at common 
law, incorporeal hereditaments) can be claimed by prescrip-
tion, such as easements, rights of way, profits a prendre, fran-
chises, rights to the use of water, etc. Probably the most 
common example of the application of the doctrine is seen in 
the acquisition, by prescription, of a right of wa.y over the 
land of another. 
"A right to the appropriation of 'vater from a str-eam in 
excess of the reasonable use to 'vhich one is entitled may be 
acquired by prescription as .against the lower riparian owners. 
So, also, one may acquire a pr-escriptive right to the main-
tenance o:£ a dam or obstruction so as to flood the land of an-
other, or to maintain a drain over another's land, or to pol-
lute the water of a stream, provided such pollution is not detri-
mental to the public. Likewise the courts hav-e recognized 
that one may acquire, by prescription, the right to take water 
from the land of another person, the right to fish in a. stream 
on another's land, the right to navigate a ferry, the right to 
maintain a portion of one's house, such as the eaves of the 
roof or the cornice, which were so constructed as to extend 
over the adjoining land of another.'' 
In Jones on Easements (1898), §799, the author states: 
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''An easement for the flow of water through an artificial 
waJer course upon the land of another may be acquired by 
prescription. · 
"If it appears, however, that the enjoyment of such right 
of drainage through the land of another was not adverse, but 
tnerely· permissive, or tha.t the drain was kept over on the 
servient estate for the use of the owner, no easement can be 
acquired by prescription. 
''The right to use a ditch through the land of another for 
the purpose of drainage may be acquired by adverse use for 
twenty years or other prescriptive period. Such use is evi .. 
dence of an antecedent grant. 
"And so an easement may be acquired to use an artificial 
canal through the land of another to divert the water of a 
stream to a mill. Such easement may be appurtenant to the 
mill, and this will pass with the mill upon a conveyance of that. 
''A right of drainage acquired by prescription does not 
give the right to drain an increased quantity of water and 
thereby cause damage to the servient estate by overflows. 
The beneficial use of a ditch for a length of time sufficient 
to raise a presumption of a grant of a right gives no right 
to use another ditch differing therefrom materially either in 
locality or dimension. 
''The right to use the water of an artificial aqueduct, or of a 
well, may be acquired by an uninterrupted use of it for twenty 
years. The right. so acquired is, of course, limited to the ex-
tent and manner of such use during that period." 
See also 67 C. J., §307. 
''An easement of drainage through a. ditch to or across 
the land of another may also be acquired by prescription, 
provided the use thereof has extended for the required time, 
bas had the necessary elements of being adverse, peaceful, 
uninterrupted and under a claim of right, and that the ditch 
or drain has been an apparent, open, visible or notorious 
encumbrance, although there is authority to the effect that a 
color of title or claim of right is not necessary. While the 
lower owner has no right to obstruct the flow of surface 
water where a. prescriptive right of drain has been acquired, 
such an easement gives no right to enlarge or vary the· ser-
vitude beyond the condition under 'vhich it has been exer-
cised during the prescriptive period, although the upper 
owner has a right to clean out the ditch. In the absence of 
negligence, the lower owner cannot recover damages because 
of the use of the easement by the upper owner.'' 
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4 McQuillan Municipal Corporations, 2d Ed., §1558. 
§1558 (1441) Same-prescriptive right to maintain nuisance. 
The right to pollute the waters of a stream by discharging 
sewage into it is in the nature of an easement, which can be 
created only by grant or by prescription. The period. of req-
uisite to establish such right is that which, under the statute 
of limitations, bars a right of entry. The user upon which 
the prescriptive right ·is founded must be adverse in its char-
acter; mere permissive user cannot create such a right. The 
right of a municipality to pollute the 'vater of a stream can-
not be acquired by prescription if the pollution is such as to 
be injurious to the public health. 
The rule that the right of a municipality to pollute streams 
with its sewage may be acquired by adverse user is subject 
to the limitation that if the pollution is substantially increased 
the prescriptive right is lost, as the use must continue and 
be the same as it was when the period of prescription com-
menced. Where a city, upon authority of resolutions of its 
legislative body, has made exclusive, adverse and uninter-
rupted use of a culvert for fifty years as a part of its sewer 
system, it wa.s held that its title to the culvert was as if 
it had acquired the same by express grant. Mere oral con-
sent of a riparian owner to the pollution of the waters of the 
stream by; the discharge of sewage therein vests in the muni-
cipal corporation no right which is not in the power of such 
owner at any time to recall. 
Of course, in the present case no question of injury to 
the public health is presented. 
In Sturgis v. Meridian, 95 Miss. 35, 48 So. 620 (1909), the 
Court held where an artificial ditch had been dug for more 
than ten years and continuously used since that time by a 
city to carry off water falling upon certain area. of the city, 
the city obtained. the right by prescription to maintain the 
ditch. That the right was limited by the character and extent 
of the right exercised during the period of prescription, and 
it not thereafter enlarge. the ditch either by actual excavation 
or by increasing flow. of water. 
In Kray v. Muggli, et al. (1901), 84 Minn. 90, 86 N. W. 882, 
the facts are as follows : · 
In 1856 a dam was built across a river for the purpose of 
furnishing water power to a mill. This backed the water up 
on to the property of Muggli and others, and flooded the land, 
and formed lakes and ponds. This condition existed for 
more than forty years, and the upper property owners had 
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improved their property with reference to the artificial con-
ditions of the water so caused by the dam. When the mill 
owners decided to take down the dam and destroy the con-
ditions above it, which had existed for so many years, they 
were enjoined from so doing. The court held that the prop-
erty owners up the river had acquired prescriptive right to 
compel the mill owner to continue the dam below so as to 
maintain the water on their lands in the condition in which 
it had been for a long period of years. The court said in 
part: 
''The authorities are numerous that where the flow of a 
stream of wa.ter has been diverted from its natural channel, 
or obstructed by a permanent dam, and such diversion or 
obstruction has continued for the time necessary to establish 
a prescriptive right to perpetually maintain the same, the 
riparian owners along such stream of water, who have im-
proved their property with reference to the change, and in 
reliance on the continuance thereof, acquire a reciprocal right 
to have the artificial conditions remain undisturbed; and the 
person who placed the obstruction in the stream, or caused 
the diversion of the waters, and all those claiming under or 
through him are estopped upon principles of equity from 
restoring the waters to their natural channel or state. Beeston 
v. Weate, 5 El. ~ Bl. 986; Roberts v. Richards, 50 Law J. Ch. 
297; Jones, Easem., §808; Gould, Waters, §§159, 225; Ark-
wright v. Gell, 10 Eng. Ruling C'as. 225; Belknap v. Trimb'le, 
3 Paige 577. In the latter case, one involving the question 
here presented, the court said: 'I apprehend, also, that this 
rule must be reciprocal, and that a proprietor of the head of 
a stream, who had changed the natural flow of the waters and 
has continued such change for more than 20 years, cannot 
afterwards be permitted to restore it to its natural state, when 
it will have the effect to destroy mills or other properties 
below which have been erected in reference to such change in 
a natural flow of the stream.' '' 
• 
"Smith v. Youman-s (Wis.), 70 N. W. 1115, 37 L. R~ A. 285, 
is also directly in point. It is there held that it is but a. fair 
inference that riparian owners, in view of advantages that 
might or would accrue to them by raising the level of the 
waters of the lake on which their lands border, were induced 
to consent and acquiesce therein, and in the use of the dam 
and waters as raised thereby, in view of which it was held 
that the relations and interests of the parties thus originated 
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and created became fixed by prescription, and imposed upon 
each reciprocal rights and duties. The court said: 'It has 
long been settled that the artificial state or condition of flowing 
water, founded upon prescription, becomes a substitute for 
the natural condition previously existing, and from which a 
right arises on the part of those interested to have the new 
condition maintained. The water course, though artificial, 
may have originated under such circumstances as to give 
rise to all the rights riparian proprietors have in a natural 
and permanent stream, or have been so long used as to be-
come a natural wa.ter course prescriptively; and when a 
riparian owner has diverted the water into an artificial chan-
nel, and- continues such change for more than 20 years, he 
cannot restore it to its natural channel, to the injury of other 
proprietors along such channel, who have erected works or 
cultivated their lands with reference to the changed condi-
tion of the stream, or to the injury of those upon the artificial 
water course who have acquired by long use the right to en-
joy the water there flowing·.' See also Canton Iron Co. v. 
Biwabik Bessemer Co., 63 Minn. 367, 65 N. W. 643. 
''The dam in question, having been erected for the purpose 
of developing power to operate mill machinery, must be taken 
to be a permanent obstruction; and, it having existed and 
been maintained as such for so great a length of time, the 
artificial conditions created thereby must be deemed to have 
become the natural conditions. There is no suggestion in the 
evidence that the dam was placed in the river for temporary 
purposes, and, even though it may a.t one time have been 
out of repair, it was nevertheless originally intended as a per-
manent structure. The authorities all hold, as far as our 
examnia tion has extended, that in such cases the conditions 
arising fr~m the permanent obstruction, though artificial to 
begin with, become by long lapse of time the natural condi-
tions, and interested parties are bound by the rules of law 
applicable to such conditions. M agor v. Chadwick, 11 A dol. 
&. E. 571; Beeston v. Weate, 5 El. & Bl. 986; Roberts v. Rich-
ards, supra;' lJ!lathewson v. Hoff'lnan, supra; Finley v. Hershey, 
41 Iowa 389; M1trchie v. Ga.tes, 78 l.vie. 300, 4 Atl. 698." 
III. The state is not involved in this case, and prescriptive. 
right can be acquired against the rafil·road contpany in the 
use of the canal property. 
This case is readily distinguished fron1 the cases which 
hold that prescriptive rights cannot be acquired in State 
c~nals. It is a well-established doctrine, and not disputed 
by the City of Lynchburg, that prescription will not run 
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against the government. But the State is not here involved. 
The canal never was State owned. The company operating it 
was a private corporation, organized for profit, and that the 
State at one time owned ·stock in the canal company did 
not make it a State owned canal. But even if it were to be 
regarded as a State owned canal, so long as the James River 
and Kanawha Company owned the property, that condition 
ceased wherl the property was conveyed to the Richmond and 
Alleghany Railroad Company under the Act of 1879. It then 
became private property of a private corporation and sub-
ject to the same rules, with reference to prescriptive rights, 
as the property of any other corporation. If the City had 
never used the canal for a sewer outlet prior to 1879, it would 
still have acquired prescriptive rights therein since that date 
by its constant, uninterrupted adverse use for over fifty 
years. 
Either the canal company or the railroad company could 
have granted to the City the right to use the canal perpetually 
for a sewer outlet, and could have bound itself to maintain 
the canal for that purpose. If it could do so by contract, then 
such rights can and have been acquired by the City by pre-
scription. . 
The Act of February 27, 1879, contemplated the substi-
tution of a railroad for a canal as a means of transportation. 
For the benefit of private interests, the Act provided that 
existing contracts for water privileges should be respected, 
and that the railroad company should maintain the present 
water supply of the canal along the Lynchburg level. Thus, 
as soon as the railroad 'vas completed and other sections of 
the canal abandoned, the canal could no longer be used as a 
means of transportation, and, indeed, no such further use was 
contemplated. In leasing its water for use by private per-
sons, it was conducting a private enterprise; and, certainly, 
under the provisions of the Act of 1879 ·and the decision of 
the Court of Appeals in the case of Hurt & Son v. lJIIyers 
and Axtell, Receivers, 83 Va. 167, there can be no question 
but that the railroad company not only had to respect exist-
ing contracts, but also had the privilege of entering into new 
leases for the use of its water. It became a private owner of 
water with the power to lease water rights, grant water rights, 
and to do any other act incident to such ownership. 
Before and after the Act of 1879, the City used the canal 
as a sewer outlet. It cannot be doubted that before the pre-
scriptive period had run, the owner of the canal could have 
forced the City to pay for this right or to desist from its use. · 
While we must accept the opinion of this court as handed 
down by Justice Eggleston on March 11, 1937, in the case of 
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John H. Heald Co., et als., v. the Chesapeake and Ohio Ratil-
wa;y Compatny to the effect that the requirements imposed by 
that act upon the railroad company as the purchaser of the 
canal property, was in the public interest, and that the duties 
were public duties, that does not affect certain prescriptive 
rights which the City of Lynchburg has acquired, under other 
decisions· of this Court. 
In Chesapeake and Ohio ,canal Company, et als., v. Great 
Falls Power Company, 143 Va., page 697, the question was 
whether or not the Great Falls Power Compariy had acquired 
by adverse possession the title to a portion of the canal for-
merly owned by the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal Co., and the 
defense was made by the canal company that title by adverse 
possession cannot be established in a public highway, and 
that the canal strip and property appurtenant was, by the 
charter of the company, made a public highway. 
Justice Holt says on page 717 of 143 Virginia: 
''This subject is discussed in an extended note in 87 Am. 
St. Rep. 775. The law applicable to railroads is stated to be~ 
'And while it is perhaps true that there can be no adverse 
possession of that portion of a railroad right of way which 
is covered by the track or buildings, or is in use by the rail-
road, this is so, not because of any public use to which it is 
devoted, but because ''the presence of a track constantly in 
use is a definite badge of ownership and the only practical 
assertion of title that can be made.'' Jones on Easements, 
Section 281. If, however, an individual has, for the statutory 
period, enjoyed a possession of a portion of a railroad right 
of way, adverse to the title of the railroad company, by the 
great weight of authority, title will vest in him to the exclu-
sion of the corporation.' Many cases cited.'' 
In the late case of Raton v. Pollard (C. C. A.), 270 Fed. 5, 
the court said: · 
" 'The general and approved rule is that title may be 
gained by adverse possession to portions of a railroad com-
pany's right of way.' '' 
In Alea;ander, etc., Storage Company v. Central Railway 
of ·Georgia, 182 Ala. 516, 62 So. 7 45, the court said : 
" 'This same rule, however, does not apply to a railroad 
· right of way which is not in actual use. Title to portions of 
it may be acquired by adverse possession and may be there-
by vested in an individual so acquiring it, to the exclusion 
' , 
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of the railroad corporation. There is good reason for the 
difference of the two rules. While the right of way is, in a 
sense, a public highway, and the land is taken for and devoted 
to a public use, it is nevertheless the private pro.perty of the 
public utility corporation. The corporation's officials are not 
public officers, and its objects and purposes are private as well 
as public in a sense.' '' 
In Freeman's note in 87 Am. St. Rep., supra, it is said: 
'' 'On principle there would seem to be no reason for 
exempting a railroad company from the operation of the 
statute of limitations. Its right of way, however, much it 
may be devoted to a public use, remains private property. 
Its officials are not public officers in any true sense; its ob-
·ject is private gain. Streets and highways belonging to and 
created for the sole purpose of benefiting the public are 
uses in no way analogous to that of a railroad right of way. 
A railroad company has what a public officer has not, a direct 
and pecuniary interest in using diligence to assert its claims 
to any land held by it. There can be no question of legalizing 
a public nuisance by lapse of time. Sovereign rights are 
not involved. None of the considerations which render the 
application of the doctrine of adverse possession to public 
rights inex~dient and unwise are held present, and it is 
difficult to see why the same rule as that governing indi-
viduals and private corporations should not here control.' 
''There is little analogy between streets, highways, asylums 
for the insane maintained by the State, etc., and private cor-
porations like railroads affected with a public interest. We 
have no difficulty in reaching the conclusion that title by 
adversary possession might ripen against unused portions 
of a railroad right of way. 
''On the other hand, there is no difference whatever in 
principle between railroads and canals when they are owned 
and operated by private corporations. 
'' 'Whatever proprietary title the trustees of a canal com-
pany assert to property distinct from the public use to which· 
it is dedicated, is subject to be extinguished by adverse oc-
cupancy during the statutory period. And where they aban-
don the canal, title to the bed. of the canal may be acquired 
by adverse possession.' 2 C. J., Section 475." 
The court, in conclusion, said: 
''The canal company once held good title to this canal 
strip and has lost it by abandonment and adverse possession, 
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and this conclusion is not affected by the fact that the defend-
ant corporation was a public service one, nor by the fact that ' 
the State was a shareholder therein and a guarantor of some 
of its bonds.'' · 
While in the instant case, the Chesapeake and Ohio Rail-
way Company did not abandon the property, yet the canal 
was not being used for transportation purposes, and while the 
City cannot claim, and is not claiming, title to the land covered 
by the canal, it has acquired prescriptive rights to maintain 
an easement across said property as an outlet for its sewers. 
Its use of the canal for a long period of years under a claim 
of right was certainly adverse to the rights of the railroad 
company and of the canal company, its predecessor in title. 
CONCLUSION. 
Summarizing briefly, it is earnestly submitted that in ac-
cordance with the well-settled rules of law on this subject, 
the City of Lynchburg has clearly acquired a prescriptive 
right to use the canal just as it has been using it for so 
many years. The user has been exercised nearly four times 
the prescriptive period. I~ has been used continuously, ex-
clusively and with the knowledge and acquiescence of the 
owner. The use was adverse because of its unexplained origin, 
and further, by reason of the fact that it was a use which gave 
rise to legal redress. 
The demurrer· filed by the defendant states in substance 
that no prescriptive rights could be obtained in the canal 
because it has been affected with a public interest and for 
the public benefit. We take it that the theory behind this 
contention is that since prescription rests on a supposed grant, 
prescriptive right cannot obtain against the servient estate 
where the owner thereof had no authority to make such a 
grant. The defendant then must be claiming that it and its 
predecessors had no authority to grant perpetual water rights 
or water uses. 
· In the case before the Court, after the Act of February 27, 
1879, providing, as it did, for the closing of the canal as a 
carried and with the subsequent abandonment of the canal as 
provided in the Act, the canal no longer existed for the public 
purpose for which it was chartered. Thus, when the canal 
property was transferred, the railroad company purchaser 
became seized of all the canal property in fee simple, but with-
out the public duty of continuing in the canal business. In 
other·~words, it held this property in the same way that any 
other private person holds property, and it follows that rights 
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in this property could be obtained just as in the case of prop-
·erty being held by any other person. · 
Any contention· that the grant of sewer rights would have 
been ultra vires is, it seems, definitely refuted by specific 
language of the Act of 1879, by which the company was given 
the right to sell water rights. The provisions inserted in the 
.act to protect existing 'vater contracts and to maintain the 
Lynchburg level was done for one reason only-to confirm, 
ratify and protect and place the State's approval on private 
contracts, including a perpetual grant theretofore made be-
tween the canal company on one hand and a private industry. 
on the other. It was recognized that the canal company 
had been engaging in the private business of granting and 
leasing water rights along with its public functions of main-
taining the canal for navigation purposes. But instead of say-
ing that these private contracts were 'ultra vit·es-the State 
alone could complain-the State demanded that as a 
part of the consideration in the purchase of the canal 
properties, the purchaser must respect these contracts 
and continue to maintain the Lynehburg level. Thus, 
the State was no longer interested in the canal business, 
but 'vas clearly interested in sanctioning and approving pri-
vate grants and contracts theretofore entered into by the canal 
company, and this, of course, would apply to such private 
riglits as had been acquired by the City of Lynchburg by 
prescription for the use of the canal for se,vage purposes. 
It cannot be doubted that the railroad company had the 
right to make new and binding contracts for leasing water; 
it could have made them perpetually, had it so desired. The 
contracts were never subject to supervision by the State Cor-
poration Commission as to rates, as any other public utility 
would have been, and, in fact, were never submitted to the Cor-
poration Commission for approval; neither was it necessary 
for the Corporation Commission to agree to a contract, had 
one been required, granting the City of Lynchburg the right 
for disposal of sewage. 
The instant case differs from the Heald case in the im-
portant particular that there the plaintiff claime~ under con-
tracts, and notice of termination had been given in accord-
ance with the terms thereof. The court held that the contracts 
having been terminated by due notice, there was no further 
duty on the railway company to continue the canal after the 
expiration of the contracts. The decision in that case does 
not, of course, in any way apply to the City of Lynchburg, 
which is claiming prescriptive rights. 
The City's position, we submit, is exactly the same as if 
an instrument of the present owner, or its predecessors in 
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·title, could be produced which granted to the City the per-
petual right to use the canal as a sewer outlet, because pre-
scriptive rights rest on the fiction of a grant. 
It is respectfully submitted that the appeal should be 
granted. The precise question here involved is one of first 
impression in Virginia. It is a matter of great importance 
to the City of Lynchburg, because it involves an expenditure. 
of from $30,000.00 to $50,000.00 on the part of the City if the 
decree of the lower court is sustained; and, of course, it is of 
great importance to the Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Com-
. pany to have its rights settled by this court. 
This petition is to be taken as the opening brief of the 
appellant. 
An opportunity to present oral argument in behalf of the 
granting of the petition herewith presented is requested. 
A copy of this petition was delivered to S. H. Williams, 
of connse1 for the defendant, on the 19th day of April, 1937. 
Respectfully submitted, 
THE CITY OF LYNCHBURG, A MUNI-
CIPAL CORPORATION, 
By T. G. HOBBS, 
ROBERT D. MORRISON, 
Attorneys for petitioner. 
I, T. G. Hobbs, the undersigned counsel practicing in the 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, do hereby certify 
that in my opinion, the rulings and decree of the Corporation 
Court for the City of Lynchburg in the above-mentioned case 
are erroneous, and that said decree should be reviewed and 
reversed. 
Given under my hand this 19th day of April, 1937. 
T. G. HOBBS. 
June 3, 1937. Appeal awarded by the court. No bond. 
M. B. W., 
Clerk Supreme Court of Appeals. 
Received tTune 12, 1937. 
M.B.W. 
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RECORD 
.VIRGINIA: 
Pleas before the Honorable Aubrey E. Strode, Judge of 
the Corporation Court for the City of Lynchburg, at the 
Court House thereof, on the 9th day of December, 1936, 
and in the 161st year of the Commonwealth. 
Be it remembered that heretofore, to-wit, at Lynchburg 
Corporation Court on the lOth day of February, 1936, the 
following order was entered : 
City of Lynchburg, a municipal corporation, Plaintiff, 
v. 
The Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Company, Defendant. 
This day came the plaintiff by counsel and upon motion, 
there being no objection thereto, leave was granted it to file 
its bill of complaint with exhibits thereto; and upon_ like 
motion of the defendant by counsel, there being no objection 
thereto, it filed its demurrer to said bill of complaint, in which 
said demurrer the plaintiff joins. · 
The> Bill of Complaint referred to in the foregoing order is 
in the words and figures following, to-wit: 
To the Honorable Aubrey E. Strode, Judge of the Corporation 
Court for the City of Lynchburg: 
Your complainant, the City of Lynchburg, a municipal cor-
poration, respectfully shows unto Your Honor, the following 
state of facts: 
1. The main business section of the City of Lynchburg, 
and a large part of the residential section of the City of 
Lynchburg, including practically all of what is known as the 
''Old City'', lies on a bill which extends from a short distance 
from the southern bank of James River below the mouth of 
Blackwater Creek, opposite or about opposite 8th Street, to 
the top of College Hill, the highest point in the City, a dis-
tance of a mile or more. 
page 2 ~ The Town of Lynchburg was established by act 
of General Assembly of Virginia in the session 
which began· on October 16, 1786. It then consisted of 45 
acres of land belonging to John Lynch, which lay on the 
northeast slope of the hil1 above mentioned beginning at 
the foot of the slope, which was a short distance from the 
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south bank of James River, east and south of Blackwater 
Creek. It extended up the hill to what is no'v Court Street, 
and from about where Fourth Street is on the north to 12th 
Street on the east. 
The act incorporating the Town was passed by the Gen-
eral Assembly on January 10, 1805. From time to time the 
limits of the Town or City of Lynchburg were extended by 
the acts of the legislature. By act of January 30, 1826, the 
limits were extended so as to run from Harrison Street on 
the west and south to James River and Horseford Branch, 
thence up the river to Blackwater Creek, and up the Creek 
to the northern boundary of the town. By act of May 20, 1852, 
the limits were extended as far as Monroe St. By an act of 
December 9, 1870, the limits w·ere extended so as to begin on 
the north bank of James River, at the intersection of the 
Southern Railway bridge, at the south side of Railroad Bridge 
(no·w the Norfolk & Western) at the lower end of Percival's 
Island (no'v known as the Norfolk & vVestern Island), thence 
to the south bank of James River and I{ana:wha Canal; thence 
with the south bank of the Canal to the ravine at the east 
base of White Rock Hill; then with the old main line of the 
Southern Railway to 'vhat is now approximately the line of 
the present main line of the Southern Railway Company; 
thence approximately with the present line of the Southern 
Railway Company main line to BlaclC\Vater Creek; thence 
with Blackwater Creek to the Norfolk & Western Tunnel, 
through the Tunnel; thence across Blackwater Creek by 
a straight line to the Southern abutment of the Southern 
Railway Bridge across James River; thence with the bridge 
to the north bank of James River; thence down 
page 3 ~ the River to the beginning. 
By these various extensions the City was enlarged 
from time to time until it took in all of the territory run-
ning from James River from above the Chesapeake & Ohio 
or Watenvorks Dam to the present corporate limits of the 
City at the mouth of Fishing Creek below Heald's paper 
mill. The town, and later the City, was gradually built up in 
this territory occupying in general terms all the sma11 flat area 
along the southern hank of James River and the entire slope· 
of the hill running from said flat to the top of College Hill 
at approximately the location of Floyd Street as at present 
located. This area includes the main manufacturing and busi-
ness section of the City and that portion of the residential 
section generally known as the'' Old City''. From the natural 
topography of the territory all of the natural drainage and 
sewer lines from the top of College Hill north, serving this 
entire area of the City, drains towards James River. · 
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In the years 11838, 1839 and 1840, the James River and 
Kanawha Canal was constructed from Richmond up the banks 
of the James River, being completed to Lynchburg in 1840. 
The Canal was constructed in that portion of the present City 
limits along the foot of the hill on which the City was built, 
from Fishing Creek, the present eastern and southern· cor-
porate limits of the City, to slightly above or northwest of 
9th Street, to the point where the Canal crossed Blackwater 
Creek on a viaduct. This left a flat area 100 to 200 yards 
wide between the Canal and the southern bank of James 
River. 
The construction of the canal in this location in 1840 effec-
tually. placed a. barrier between the City proper, located on 
the hill as aforesaid, and James River, and prevented the 
construction of sewers, both storm and sanitary, from the 
main part of the City to James River, the natural outlet, 
except in two cases where culverts following natural streams 
were constructed before the Canal. 
Prior to the time of the construction of the Canal, 
page 4 ~ it is not known whether or not there were any 
sewers running from the City of Lynchburg to 
James River between the Waterworks Dam and the present 
southern corporate linrits at ],ishing Creek. Prior to that 
period of time, there probably was no g·eneral sewer system 
in the town or city of Lynchburg, as living conditions and the 
smallness of the population did not make such system neces-
sary. It is not known just 'vhen the first sewer was con-
tructed by the City, but it is known that for at least seventy-
five years past both sanitary and storm sewers have been 
constructed by the City emptying into the Canal along the 
Lynchburg level from the Waterworks Dam to the present 
lower corporate limits at Fishing Creek. 
Sewers built and maintained by the City_ of Lynchburg 
emptying into said Canal between the Water Works Dam and 
the lower corporate limits of the City are nine in number and 
are indicated on the plat here"rith filed marked Exhibit #1, 
nnd as such asked to be read as a part of this bill. Blocks 
numbered 1 and 2 on said plat show two sections, largely 
residential, served by two of the sewers emptying into the 
Canal. Blocks numbered 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 ancl 8 show the area 
served by six of the sewers emptying into the Canal. These 
areas running from approximately 6th Street on .the north 
to '\Y ashington Street on the south and back to Court Street 
on the west, include the main retail and wholesale portions 
of the City and where all banks, hotels and some of the manu-
facturing industries are located, as well as a portion of the 
residential section. All of these sewers empty into the Canal 
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below Blackwater Creek Viaduct. Block numbered 9 .on the 
said plat indicates the area served by what is known as the 
'' C Street Sewer'' in a residential section which empties into 
the Canal above the Blackwater Creek Viaduct. Block num-
bered 10 on said plat shows the area served by sewers empty-
ing into Fishing Creek. Blocks 11 and 12 show areas served 
by two stone culverts, which were constructed un-
page 5 ~ der the Canal before the Canal was put into opera-
tion and which culverts empty into James River; 
Block 13 shows the Rivermont Area of said city served by 
sewers emptying into James River. Block 14 shows the area 
.served by sewers emptying into Blackwater Creek. 
All of said sewers have been constructed and maintained 
by the City of Lyncl1burg for more than twen~y years next 
preceding the institution of this suit, under the claim of right 
of the City of Lynchburg that it had the right to construct, 
maintain and empty said sewers into said Canal and to use 
said Canal as a perpetual outlet for said sewers, and such 
use of the Canal.by -the City has been open, adverse, exclu-
sive, continuous, uninterrupted and with the knowledge and 
acquiescence of the present owners of said Canal. The locu-
tion of said Canal within the corporate limits of the City of 
Lynchburg absolutely cut off the natural drainage, both for 
surface water and sanitary sewers, from the main part of 
the City to James River, the then only possible outlet for 
.the flow of water from the streets and sewers of the City, 
so that unless the City constructed sewers all the way to 
James RivP.r under the canal, and the railroad tracks and 
industrial properties at a tremendous and prohibitive cost, 
the City must of a necessity use the Canal for such outlets. 
The City alleges that it had such right to so use the Canal 
because the approach to James River, the natural outlet, 
·was completely blocked by the Canal, except as above set 
forth. · 
The City of Lynchburg· is advised and charges that the 
Chesapeake & Ohio Railway· Company is no'v proposing to 
entirely close said Canal from the \Vaterworks Dam to be-
low the lower corporate limits of the City and fill it in, and 
therefore absolutely destroy the outlets for the City's said 
sewers. The purpose of this suit is to enjoin and prevent 
t.he Chesapeake & Ohio R-ailway Company from closing and 
:filling said Canal and thereby destroying the outlet for the 
SP.wers above set forth. It will be necessary to set 
page 6 ~ forth some history of the James River and Kana-
wha Canal in addition to that already above men-
tioned. 
A large portion of the money necessary for the construe-
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tion of said Canal was furnished by the State of Virginia 
and approximately four-fifths of the stock of said Company 
was o'vned by the State of Virginia. After the Civil War 
the Canal Company met with financial difficulty. On Feb-
ruary 28, 1878, the General Assembly of Virginia passed an 
act incorporating the Richmond and Alleghany Railroad 
Company and authorized it to purchase the properties of 
the James R.iver and J{anawha Company. (See Acts 1877, 
1878, Chap. 123, page 116). By an act of the General As-
sembly, approved February 27, '1879, (Acts of 1878-1879, 
Chap. 139, page 318), the sale of the properties of the James 
River and Kanawha Company to the Richmond and Alle-
ghany Railroad Company was authorized and approved on 
terms therein set forth. The deed carrying this ac~ into ef-
fect was dated the 4th day of March, 1880, from the James 
River and J{anawha Company to the Richmond and Alle~hany 
Railroad Company. There is filed herewith as Exhibit #2 
a copy of said deed of 1\:farch 4, 1880, and as such is asked to 
be read as a part of this bill. The Act of :February 27, 1879, 
is fully set forth in said deed and reference is here made to 
said exhibits for the complete terms of said act and for a 
description of the properties conveyed by said deed and the 
terms of conveyance. 
The property to be sold and which was conveyed by said 
deed was ''all its works, property and franchises" (Clause 
1 of said act.) _ 
The act provided that ''thP. contract of sale and convey-
ance aforesaid shall contain the following provisions and 
conditions and shall not contain any condition or provision 
inconsistent therewith". These terms were most favorable 
to the R·ailroad Company and under the deed the Railroad 
Company acquired a graded right of way for its tracks from 
Richmond to Buchanan and Lexington, Va. through Lynch-
burg. The consideration to be paid by the Richmond and 
Alleghany Company for said properties of the 
page 7 ~ James River and Kanawha Company are set forth 
in paragraphs 1st and 2nd of Section 1 of said act, 
and are as follows : 
''First: The consideration to be paid and rendered by the 
Richmond and Alleghany Railroad Company and the condi-
tions of the sale and conveyance shall be the maintenance 
of the Canal as a line of commerce, ·subject, however, to the 
interruptions and abandonment contemplated by the ninth 
clause of the first section; and the construction and equip-
ment of the railroad hereinafter described, which shall be a 
:first class railroad with ste.el rails, the same guage· of the 
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Chesapeake & Ohio Railway, and equipped with ample ac-
commodation for all passenger travel and freight transpor-
tation, within the time hereinafter limited, and the perform-
ance of the. duties prescrib-ed by the Sixth Clause of this first 
section; and also the assumption and payment of all the debts 
and obligations of the said James River and Kanawha Com-
pany, which. could be asserted against the James River and 
J{anawha Company, without m-eaning thereby to acknowl-
edge or give i)l any manner any validity to any such debt or 
obligation which it would not have if the same were asserted 
against the James River and J(anawha Company, and re-
serving to the R·ichmond and All-eghany Railroad Company 
the right to make any and all defences in law or in fact which 
the said James River and J(anawha Company would have 
the right to make if this contract had never been executed. 
A Schedule of such debts and obligations, including the bond 
or bonds which have been given or which are to be given to 
the State of Virginia for the maintenance, clothing and guard-
ing of convicts, which shall be a preferred debt, shall be made 
part of the contract, and such bonds to the State of Virginia 
for the maintenance of convicts, shall be a lien on all the prop-
erty, rights and franchises transferred by the James River 
and l{anawha Company to the Richmond and Alleghany Rail-
road Company, subordinate only to the mortgag·e now ex-
isting on the same, and shall be the first and preferred lien 
upon all other property, rights and franchises of the Rich-
mond and Alleghany R.ailroad Company, now owned 
page 8 ~ or that may be hereafter acquired· by it. The lien 
on the property, rights and franchises transferred 
shall be reserved in the conveyance to be made, and a mort-
gage shall be executed by the Richmond and Alleghany Rail-
road Company on its property, rights and franchises exist-
ing, or to be acquired by it, to secure such debt to the State. 
''Second : A sum of money to be agreed upon, not less 
than thirty thousand dollars nor more than fifty thousand 
dollars, shall be paid in cash by the Richmond and Alleghany 
Railroad Company, to the James R·iver and J{anawha Com-
pany, and said sum shall be expended and paid out by the 
President and directors of the James River and Kanawha 
Company in payment of salaries and wages due officers and 
employees up to the time of the transfer, 'vhich may be made 
as hereinafter provided, and in the payment of such debts, 
charges, costs and expenses as may have been incurred in the 
administration of the Con1pany since the first day of May, 
eighteen hundred and sixty-seven; and should such sum be 
insufficient to pay all such claims, the said president and 
board of directors shall have f:ull discretion and liberty in 
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paying such as they may select. But if there should be a 
surplus remaining of said sum after discharging the claims 
hereinbefore described, such surplus shall be paid to the 
Richmond and Alleghany Railroad Company. But the bonds 
which may have been g·iven, or which are to be given to the 
State of Virginia, for the maintenance, clothing and guard-
ing of convicts, and which said bonds are, by the terms of the 
contract with the State, to be payable five ye~rs after their 
date, shall not be included in the charges and expenses of ad-
ministration payable under this clause, though fully included 
in the debts and obligations assumed by the Richmond and 
Alleghany Railroad Company''. 
Included as a part of the consideration for the properties 
conveyed was the performance by the purchaser of the obli-
gations imposed upon it by the 6th clause of said Section 1 
of said act specifically referred to in Clause First 
page 9 ~ of said section. The provisions of the 6th Clau~e 
of said Section 1 of said act of February 27, 1879, 
are as follows : 
'' Sh:th: It is hereby provided that the rate of dockage at 
Richmond shall not exceed the rate at present established by 
the James River and l(ana,vha Company, and all existing 
contracts for water privileges along the entire line shall be 
respected and maintained at rates not exceeding the present 
rates, except in those cases in which they shall be cancelled 
or altered by agreement or extinguished by condemnation. 
It shall be the duty of the Richmond and Alleghany Railroad 
Company to maintain the present water supply of the docks 
and of the canal along its line betwe-en Bosher's dam and tide-
water, and along the Lynchburg· level between the Water 
vVorks dam (which shall be preserved) above Lynchburg and 
the first lock below Lynchburg, and in the construction of its 
railroad it shall not so destroy or obstruct the present canal 
between Bosher's dam and tidewater or between the water 
works dam above Lynchburg and! the first lock below Lynch-
burg, as to lessen the present water supply". 
This provision was undoubtedly inserted for the benefit 
of such of the industries which had grown up along the canal 
at Richmond and on the Lynchburg ]evel of the canal and 
because of the canal, for the reason that the canal furnished 
what was thoug·ht to be a permanent source of water for use 
in manufacturing purposes and for furnishing water power 
to said industries, and also for the purpose of protecting the 
rights of the City of Lwnchburg to use said canal as a sewer 
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outlet, some of the sewers having- been constructed so as to 
empty into said canal prior to the time of said act. It will 
be noted that the language of said act in the 6th clause is 
perpetual in nature and contains no limitation as to time, but 
provides that the company ''shall maintain the present water 
supply of the canal along· the Lynchburg level between the 
Water Works Dam (which is to be preserved) above Lynch-
burg·, and the first lock below Lynchburg, and in 
page 10 ~ the construction of the railroad it shall not so de-
stroy or obstruct the present canal between the 
water works dam above Lynchburg and the first lock below 
Lynchburg, as to lessen the present 'vater supply". 
Inasmuch as the canal was no longer to be used for the 
purposes of transportation or as a carrier, there was no pur-
pose in this provision of the act providing that the canal 
should be kept open except for the benefit of the City's sewers 
and of the industries located on the canal. 
In about 1882 ,pursuant to a special act of the General As-
sembly of Virginia of March 6, 1882 (Acts of 1.881-2, Chapter 
257, page 267) the Richmond and Alleg·hany Railroad Com-
pany re-constructed the dam which had been constructed by 
the City of Lynchburg in or about the year 1830 and extended 
it entirely across James River. The dam as so rebuilt in 
1881 or 1882, constitutes the Lynchburg· dam, from which the 
flow of water into the canal is secured. 
· A perusal of this act will sho'v that it was probably en-
acted at the request of the Richmond and Alleghany Rail-
road Company, and certain shows that at that time the legis-
lature interpreted the act of February 27, 1879, as requiring 
a perpetual supply of water in the canal. 
The act of the Richmond and Alleg·hany Railroad Company 
in constructing the dam entirely across James River in 1881 
and 1882, shows that it regarded the. obligation to keep the 
canal open as a perpetual obligation which it went to great 
~xpense to enable it to carry out in a more complete and 
larg·er manner. 
The Richmond and Alleghany Railroad Company failed, 
and its properties, including said canal at the Lynchburg 
level, were conveyed to the Richmond and Alleghany Rail-
road Company by deed dated May 20, 1889, from E. R. Le-
land, Special Commissioner et als. In this deed the grantee 
company assumed all of the liabilities and oblig·ations of the 
Richmond and Alleg·hany Railr9ad Company lUI-
page 11 r der the act of F'ebruary 27, 1879, and the deed of 
~!arch 4, 1880. A copy of said deed of May 20, 
1889 is filed herewith as Exhibit #3, and as such asked to 
be read as a part of this bill. 
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The Richmond and Alleghany ~ilway Company likewise 
failed and its properties, including said canal at the Lynch-
burg level, were conveyed to the Chesapeake & Ohio Railway 
Company by deed dated January 20, 1890. In this deed the 
grantee company assumed all liabilities with respect to the 
canal imposed by said act of February 27, 1879, and said deed 
of March 4, 1880. A copy of said deed of January 20, 1890, 
is filed herewith as Exhibit #4 and as such asked to be read 
as a part of this bill. ' 
~n the year 1932 the Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Company 
entered into a contract 'vith the Appalachian Electric Power · 
Company, for the sale to the latter company of the dam across 
James River at Lynchburg, together with the appurtenant 
right and privilege to use and enjoy the entire flow of the 
water in James River at said dam and lands adjacent thereto, 
subject to the rights of the City of Lynchburg as set forth 
in the deed betwe·en the Richmond and Alleghany Railroad 
Company and the City of Lynchburg, dated August 7, 1881, 
and subject also to the rights of existing leases of water 
po,ver along the James River and Kanawha Canal in and 
below said dam. This contract stated that it is contemplated 
that said James River and Kanawha Canal shall be wholly 
abandoned as therein provided for, and that within six months 
from the date of the agreement appropriate proceeding should 
be instituted in the names of the C. & 0. Railway Company 
and the Appalachian Electric Power Company before the 
State Corporation Commission in order to obtain all neces-
sary legal authority for the complete abandonment of said 
James River and l{anawha Canal. This proceeding was in-
stituted before the State Corporation Commission on the 
19th day of June, 1933. The Chesapeake & Ohio Railway 
Company and the Appalachian Electric Power Company filed. 
their joint applications for leave 
page 12 ~ '' 1. To absolve and relase the Lynchburg dam 
. across the James River and associated properties 
from any public obligation relating to the James River and 
J{anawha Canal, and 2. To discontinue the canal at said 
Lynchburg level of the James River and l{anawha Canal and 
associated properties and to abandon their use as a public 
way." 
The prayer of this petition was as follows: 
''(a) Authorize The Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Com-
pany andjor Appalachian Electric Po,ver Company, in its 
capacity as purchaser of the said properties as aforesaid, to 
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discontinue and abandon the said Lynchburg· dam, and the 
said Lynchburg level of the James River and l{anawha Canal, 
together with all associated lands, locks, races, canals and 
other properties, as an instrumentality of public service by 
way of a canal or a source of direct water power; to t-erminate 
and abandon all public uses and duties impressed upon the 
said properties or any of them in relation to the original or 
derivative ·purposes of the canal; to discontine the flow of 
water from the water works' dam above Lynchburg into the 
Lynchburg level of the James River and l{anawha Canal be-
tween that dam and the first lock belo'v Lynchburg, to dis-
continue the present water supply of the said Lynchburg level, 
and to absolve and release the same dam from any public 
obligation relating to the said canal and its former or pres-
ent purposes and uses; to discontinue the said Lynchburg 
level as a canal or source of direct water power, and to aban-
don its use as a public way; and to take aH the same actions 
wih respect to the said Water Works Canal and other prop-
erties mentioned in Exhibit A to the extent, if any, that the 
said properties are subject to any public obligation. 
''(b) Deter1nine that any obligation or duty maintained 
preserved, created or imposed upon the owners of the prop-
erties herein involved by the said special act of February 
27, 1879, or otherwise, has been sufficiently complied with 
and altogether discharged and that the actions of the pre-
decessors in title to your petitioners and of your petitioners 
in maintaining· the said properties as a canal to 
pag·e 13 ~ this time, and in now bringing this proceeding be-
. fore your Honors for an investigation of the facts 
and a determination of the public duty, constitutes a com-
plete compliance with all such obligations and duties and 
an absolute discharge thereof. 
'' (c) Grant to your petitioners such other and further re-
lief as to equity may seem meet or as may be necessary or 
desirable for the purposes of this case.'' 
To this proceeding your complainant, the City of Lynch-
burg, and certain industries located on said canal and which 
were using· water po,ver in this manufacturing plants from 
said canal, made themselves parties by intervening petition, 
and resisted the prayer of the original petition. After sev-
eral hearings before the State Corporation Commission of 
Virginia, the said Commission, on November 28, 1933, en-
tered an order as follows: 
f 
( 
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''State Corporation Commission. 
''At Richmond, November 28, 1933. 
'' Case no 5271. 
"Before the State Corporation Commission 
33 
Ira the 1\!atter of the joint application of the Chesapeake 
and Ohio Railway Company and Appalachian Electric Power 
Company for leave 
(1) To absolve and' release the Lynchburg Dam across the 
James River and associated properties from any public obli-
gation relating to the James River and J{anawha Canal; and 
(2) To discontinue as a canal the said Lynchburg level 
of the James River and Kana\vha Canal, and associated 
properties, and to abandon their use as a public way. 
This cause coming on .this day to be heard upon the peti-
tion, the. proof of service and publication of notice, the mo-
tions to dismiss and answers filed by the City of Lynchburg, 
John H. Heald Co., Lynchburg Milling Co., Pied-
page 14 ~ mont Mills, Inc., G. Bruning Tobacco Extract Co., 
Inc., and Lynchburg Diamond Ice Factory, the mo-
tions :filed by the petitioners to dismiss and strike out the 
s&icl ans\vers, and the exhibits and testimony introduced at 
the hearing, and the matter having been argued by counsel, 
and it appearing to the Commission that no public interest 
will be adversely affected, and the Commission being fully 
advised in the premises, it is 
Ordered, Adjudged and Decreed, that all public duties or 
obligations created, maintained, preserved or imposed in 
connection with or upon the so-called Water Works Dam 
and/or Lynchburg Dam across the James River at Lynchburg 
and the so-called Lynchburg level of the former James River 
and l{anawha Canal between the said dams and the first lock 
below Lynchburg, together with all connected or associated 
lands, locks, races, canals and other properties, or imposed 
upon the owriers of the said properties, by the Act of Feb-
ruary 27, 1879, or otherwise, have been sufficiently complied 
with and are now and hereby altogether and absolutely dis-
charged; and further 
Ordered, Adjudged and Decreed, that the Chesapeake & 
Ohio R.ailway Company andjor Appalachian Electric Power 
Company ma:t, so far as any public duties are concerned, dis-
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continue and abandon the said dams and the said Lynchburg 
level of the canal, discontinue the flow of water· from the 
said dams into the said Lynchburg level of the canal, dis-
continue the present water supply of. the said Lynchburg 
level, discontinue the said Lynchburg level as a canal or a 
source of 'vater power, abandon its use as a public way, 
terminate and abandon all public uses, duties and obligations 
attached or relating to the said properties, and use and dis-
pose of the said properties, as if no such public 'use, duty or 
obligation had ever attached or related to them. 
Provided, However, that nothing in this order contained 
shall disturb or affect any rights which the City of Lynchburg 
may have to one-fifth of the flow of the James River at the 
said dams, or any rights which John H. Heald Co., 
page 15 ~ Lynchburg Milling Co., Piedmont ·Mills, Incorpo-
rated, G. Bruning Tobacco Extract Oompany, In-
corporated, or Lynchburg Dianwnd Ice Factory, or any other 
person, firm or corporation, may have to 'vater or water 
po,ver from the said Lynchburg level under their respective 
leases, or otherwise, from the Chesapeake & Ohio Railway 
Company or its predecessors in title, or any rights, if any, 
which the City of Lynchburg may have in, to or over the 
said properties for the purpose of its existing sewer sys-
tem.'' 
Your con1plainant, the City of Lynchburg, and the other 
intervenors in the proceeding- before the State Corporation 
Con1mission, all claim private rights in said canal under the 
act of February 27, 1879, on the ground that the provisions 
of Clause 6 of Section 1 above quoted were placed in said 
act for the benefit of the industries located along the Lynch-
burg· level of the canal, and for the City of Lynchburg as a 
sewer outlet and for the City of Lynchburg because it has 
acquired prescriptive rights to use said canal as a sewer out-
let as aforesaid, and your con1plainant claims that the State 
Corporation Oom1nissiou has no authority to permit the canal 
to be closed in contravention of those rig·hts. 
The above quoted order of the State Corporation Commis-
sion "ras so uncertain in its interpretation on this point that 
the. City of Lynchburg and the other corporations who wer.e 
intervenors in said case before the Corporation· Commission, 
secured an appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeals of Vir-
ginia so as to have determined among other things, whether 
or not the rights of your complainant under the A'ct of Feb-
ruary 27, 1879, or its rights to the prescriptive use of said 
canal for a sewer outlet, were affected by the order of the 
State .Corporation Commission. The Court handed down its 
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opinion on l\lfarch 14, 1935, affirming the order of the Cor-
poration Commission, which held that the Chesapeake & Ohio 
Railway Company andjor the Appalachian Electric Po,ver 
Company may, so far as· ~ny public duty is concerned, dis-
continue and abandon the dams and the said Lynchburg level 
of the canal, discontinue the flow of water from the 
page 16 ~ dams intq the Lynchburg level of the canal and 
discontinue the present water supply of the said 
Lynchburg level, and discontinue the Lynchburg level of the 
.canal as a source of water power and abandon its use as a 
public way, and terminate and abandon all public uses, duties 
and obligations attached or relating to the said properties. 
This order further provided that nothing· should disturb 
or affect any rights which the City of Lynchburg might have 
to empty its sewers into the canal. 
The Supreme Court in its opinion held that any right which 
the complainant here might have to keep said canal open as 
a sewer outlet was not affected by the order of the State Cor-
poration Commission. See opinion, rCity of Lynchburg v. 
Oomrnonwealth ex rel. C . .& 0. Railway· Co. et a~s., a:dvance 
sheet, 178 S. E. 769, et seq. 
Following this decision by the Supreme Court of Appeals, 
the Cheerapeake & Ohio Railway Company served notice on 
all of the manufacturing companies who were using water 
from said ~anal that their water rights would be terminated 
and that the canal would be closed. The City of Lynchburg 
has also been advised that as soon as the leases from the 
Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Company to the manufacturing 
industries have expired under the terms of the notices given 
them, that the canal will be closed, filled in and its use as 
an outlet for the City sewers terminated. 
If this is done, the City of Lynchburg will have no out-
let for these sewers, both storm and sanitary, and the City 
will have to secure rights of way under the many tracks of 
the Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Company, the Southern Rail-
way Company and the Norfolk & Western Railway Company 
in various places, and will have to purchase or condemn 
rights of way for its sewers through and across the prop-
erty of a number of manufacturing industries located be-
tween the canal and James River. An inspection of the plat 
filed as exhibit #l herewith shows how the area 
page 17 ~ between the canal and James River is built up 
and occupied by industrial plants. The only al-
ternative would be to permit the sewers to empty on the 
ground at their present terminii, which would be unsanitary 
and damaging to the property of the Chesapeake & Ohio 
Railway and other properties in the vicinity, and of course 
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would. not be permitted by the property owners or the court 
at their request. 
If such rights of way for the sewer outlet were secured by 
either purchase or condemnation, it would be only at tre-
mendous expense to the City. Some of the outlets would be 
almost impossible of construction, as they would have to be 
constructed under large manufacturing buildings belonging 
to the various industries located between the Canal and 
James River, and would be very damaging· in many cases to 
said industrial plants. Even if the City's sewer outlets could 
be constructed from the present terminii at the Canal to the 
River they would not be as satisfactory and would be much 
more expensive and difficult to operate and maintain, as out-
lets in the river, than they would in the Canal. The flow of 
the water in the Canal is .practically uniform, while in the 
river. the flow is not uniform and high water and sand would 
make the operation and maintenance of outlets very much 
more difficult and expensive. It is estimated that the cost of 
securing rights of 'vay and of constructing the sewer outlets 
from the Canal to the river would amount to some $40,000.00 
or $50,000.00 to the City. 
Your complainant is advised and charges that the language 
of the act of February 27, 1879, meant that the Canal at the 
Lynchburg level was to be perpetually maintained. That 
this has been concurred in by the Richmond and ... 1\..lleghany 
Railroad Company and its successor in title, the Chesapeake 
and Ohio Railway Company, is shown by their actions, in 
that they have continued to supply water and water power 
to industries desiring water or water power, located on the 
Canal, until the present time, and in 1881-1882 went to great 
expense to enlarg·e the dam for the purpose of having an 
additional water supply for such industries and 
page 18 ~ for the City "\Vater "\Vorks, and since 1880 have 
spent large sums of money in keeping the canal 
open and in condition to furnish water to all consumers and 
to provide an outlet for the City sewers, and have never 
questioned the right of the City to empty its sewers into 
said canal, but have acquiesced therein; and in that, until the 
institution of the said proceedings before the State Corpora-
tion Commission, they had taken no steps to close the canal. 
All of their said actions have shown that they interpreted 
the act to provide for the perpetual maintenance of the Canal. 
Having pursued this course for nearly sixty years, the Rail-
way Company will not now be permitted to come in and de-
stroy the industries located on said Canal by cutting off the 
water power, and destroy the sewer outlets of the City and 
impose tremendous incident expense upon the City thereby. 
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The provisions of Clause 6, Section 1 of the act referred to 
was a part of the consideration for purchase of the property. 
By said act it was made a perpetual charge upon the prop-
erty now owned by the Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Com-
pany. Your complainant has a private right in the carrying 
out of the provisions of the act and of the deed of convey-
ance, which it is entitled to have protected. · 
In light of the foregoing allegations and exhibits, this com-
plainant, the City of Lynchburg, asserts the following causes 
of action: 
That the City of Lynchburg is entitled to have said canal 
at the Lynchbu1·~ level kept open as an outlet for its sewers 
emptying into said canal, and the flow of water maintained 
therein at the same amount as existed at the time of the pas-
sag·e of thP. act of Febuary 27, 1879, or at least sufficient to 
carry off the sewage deposited in said Caunl by the City 
sewers above set forth. 
That it acquired prescriptive private rights to have the 
said canal maintained and to use the sante as an outlet for its 
said sewers by adverse, exclusive and continuous 
page 19 ~ uninterrupted use, with the knowledge and ac--
quiescence of the owners of said canal for said 
purposes for a period of more than twenty years. 
That an actual controversy has ari:.:;en between the City of 
Lynchburg and the Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Company 
with respect to the rights of the City to use c:;aid canal as a 
sewer outlet and the right of the Railway Company to close 
said canal and destroy the same as such sewer outlet, and that 
according·ly this court has jurisdiction to determine such con-
bov~:rsies and to adjudicate and dedare said rights under 
its general equity powers and under the .Act of the General 
Assembly approved ~larch 8. 1922 ( A.cts of As!"lembly, 1922, 
pa!?:e 902, etc. and ~.fichie 's Code, Sec. 6140-a). 
"\Vherefore your complainant being- remediless save in a 
court of equity where such matters are properly cognizable, 
prays that Chesapeake and Ohio Raihvay Company may be 
In ad a party defendant to· this bill and required to answer the 
same, hut not 11nder oath, ans,ver under oath being hereby 
expressly waiYC?cl; that a decree be entered perpetually en-
joining- the said Railway Company from closing said canal 
at the l;ynchburg level or diminishing the flo\V of water there-
in below that in the canal at the time of the passage of the 
Act of February 27, 1879, or at least below the amount neces-
sary to adequately carry off the sewage from the City's said 
sewers no\Y en1ptying into said canal; and that this Court 
enter a binding adjudication of right as between your com-
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plainant and the said Chesapeake and Ohio Railwav Com-
pany adjudicating and declaring the right of the City of 
Lynchburg to require the canal to be kept open by the Rail-
way Company aH a perpetual outlet for said sewers, with 
suffieient water therein to carry off the sewage therefrom 
'vholly in accordance 'vith the foregoing allegations; and that 
if be granted such other and further relief as to equity may 
seem proper and the nature of the case may demand . 
.And as in duty bound, it will ever pray. 
CITY OF LYNCHBURG, 
By L. E. LICHFORD,' 1\Iayor. 
T. G. HOBBS, City Atty. 
ROBT. D. 1\'IQR.R.ISON, A~st. City Atty., p. q. 
(Notary's certificate omitted from this transcript). 
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This deed, made this fourth day of March, A. D., 1880, by 
and between the James River and l{anawha Company, a cor-
poration under the laws of the State of Virginia, party of the 
first part, and the Richmond and Alleghany Railroad Com-
pany, also a corporation of the State of Virginia, party of the 
second part; WHEREAS, The General Assembly of the State 
of Virginia, heretofore passed an act approved February 
2-7th, 1879, entitled ''An Act to authorize the James River 
and Kanawha Company to make .sale and transfer of all its 
works, property and franchises to the Richmond and Alle-
g·hany Railroad Company, and to define the powers and 
duties of the Board of Public Works in respect thereto'', 
Which act is in the words and fig·ures following, to-wit: 
''WHEREAS in the Act incor"porating the Richmond and 
Alleghany Railroad Company the leg·islature authorized said 
Company to purchase any of the property and franchises of 
any work of internal improvement within the limits of its 
charter, and the said Company has made certain propositions 
to the James River and Kanawha Company, looking to the 
purchase of its property and franchises; therefore, 
1. Be it enacted by the General Assembly of Virginia, That 
the James River and Kanawha Company is hereby au-
thorized to sell and convey all its works, property and fran-
chises to the Richmond and Alleghany Railroad Company, 
and that the proxies of the State of Virginia, representing 
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its Stock in the James River and Kanawha 0ompany, are 
hereby authorized to vote for such sale a~d conveyance; pro-
vided that the contract of sale and the conveyance aforesaid 
shall ~ontain the following provisions and conditions, and 
shall not contain any conditions or provisions inconsistent 
therewith; provided that before any contract shall be as-
sented to by the State proxies, it shall be submitted to the 
Attorney General of the State for his advice. as to whether 
the terms of this act shall have bee~ complied with. 
''First. The consideration to be paid and rendered by the 
Richmond and Alleghany R·ailroad Company and the condi-
tions of the sale and convevance shall be the maintenance of 
the. Canal as a line of coinmerce, subject, however, to the 
interruptions and abandonment contemplated by the ninth 
clause of the first section; and the construction and equip-
ment of the railroad hereinafter described, 'vhich shall be a 
first class railroad with steel rails, the same guage of the 
Chesapeake and Ohio raihvay, and equipped with ample ac-
commodation for all passenger travel and freight transpor-
tation, within the time hereinafter limited, and the perform-
ance of the duties prescribed by the Sixth Clause of this first 
section; and also the assumption and payment of all the debts 
and obligations of the said James River and Kanawha Com-
pany, which could be asserted against the James River and 
Kanawha Company, without meaning thereby to aclmowl-
edge or give in any manner any validity to any such debt 
or obligation which it would not have if the same were as-
serted against the James River and Kanawha Company, and 
reserving to the Richmond and Alleghany Railroad Gompany 
the right to ·make any and all de1:ences in law or in fact which 
the said James River and Kanawha Company would have 
the right to make if this contract had neYer been executed. 
A Schedule of such debts and obligations, including the bond 
or bonds which may have been given or which are to be given 
to the State of Virginia for the maintenance, clothing and 
guarding of convicts which shall be a preferred 
page 21 ~ debt, shall be made part of the contract, and such 
bonds to the State of Virginia for the maintenance 
of convi~ts, shall be a lien on all the property, rights and 
franchises transferred by the James River and I{anawha 
Company to the Richmond and Alleghany Railroad Com-
pany, subordinate only to the mortgages now existing on the 
same, and shall be the first and preferred lien upon all other 
property, rights and franchises of the Richmond and Alle-
ghany R.ailroad Cotnpany, now o'vned or. that may be here-
after acquired by it. The lien on the property, rights and 
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franchises transferred s}lall be reserved in the conveyance 
to be made, and a mortgage shall be executed by the Rich-
mond and Alleg·hany Railroad Company on its property, 
rig·hts and franchises existing, or to be acquired by it, to se-
cure such debt to the State. 
Second. A sum of money to be agreed upon, not less than 
thirty thousand dollars nor more than fifty thousand dollars, 
shall be paid ~n cash by the Richmond and Alleghany Rail-
road Company, to the James River and Kanawha Company, 
and said sum shall be expended and paid out by the Presi-
dent and direct.ors of the James River and Kanawha Company 
in payment of salaries and wages due officers and employees 
up to the time of the transfer, which may be made as herein-
after provided, and in the payment of such debts, charges, 
costs and expenses as niay have been incurred in the adminis-
tration of the Company since the first day of ~lay, eighteen 
hundred and sixty-seven; and should such sum be insufficient 
to pay all such claims, the said president and board of di-
rectors shall have full discretion and liberty in paying such 
as they may select. But if there should be a surplus remain-
ing of said sum after discharging the claims hereinbefore 
described, such surplus shall be paid to the ):tichmond and 
Alleghany Railroad Cmnpany. But the bonds which may 
have been given, or which are to be given to the State of Vir-
ginia, for the maintenance, clothing and guarding of convicts, 
and which said bonds are, by the terms of the contract with 
the State, to be payahlc five years after their date, shall not 
be included in the charges and expenses of Administration 
payable under this clause thoug·h fully included in the debts 
and oblig·ations assumed by the Richmond and .Alleghany 
R.ailroad Company. ' 
Third: The Richmond and Alleghany Railroad Company, 
being· willing to make this contemplated purchase only on the 
condition that it can negotiate an equitable settlement with 
the creditors of the said James River and Kanawha Company, 
other than those specially paid under the Becond clause of this 
section, said Company reserves the right, on failure in such 
negotiation, to give notice in writing, to the President of the 
James River and Kanawha Company, or to its Secretary, or 
to any Officer found in charge of its principal office. in Rich-
mond, within sixty days from the passage of this act, of the 
failure of such negotiation. and of the consequent annulment 
of this contract; but if said notice is given within the said 
sixty days the rig·ht to give the same shaH cease, unless the 
time be extended b:v the board of directors of the James River 
and l(anawha Company, but such extension shall not exceed 
sixty days ; but the Richmond and Alleghany Railroad Com-
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pany shall never clain1 or demand from the State of Virginia 
on account of the payment, purchase or compromise of the 
outstanding bonds of the James River and l{anawha Com-
. pany which were guaranteed and afterward as-
page 22 ~ sumed by the State of Virginia, larger sum than 
that which said Richmond and Alleg·hany Railroad 
Company may expend in payment, purchase or compromise 
of said bonds. But the State· shall not be liable for any bonds 
that the Supreme Court of Appeals have decided or many 
decide the State is not liable for. 
Fourth. The Richmond and Alleghany Railroad Company 
shall deposit with the board of public works the sum of :five 
hundred thousand dollars, in market value in United States 
Bonds or that amount in market value in other public se-
curities, to be approved by said board, as a pledge for the 
completion of its railroad from Richmond, up the valley of 
the James River, on the north side of said river from the 
City of Richmond to a point at or near the Joshua dam, on 
or near the present location· of the tow path to Clifton Forg·e, 
with a branch of like gauge to Lexing-ton from the mouth of 
North River. within twenty months from the date of such 
sale and conveyance. When the said board shall be satisfied 
that twenty-five miles of said railroad are fully completed, 
it shall surrender to said Company :fifty thousand dollars in 
value of said bonds; and for each successive section of twenty-
five 1niles which n1ay be completed an additional amount of 
fifty thousand dollars in value shall be surrendered, and on 
the completion of the whole work the 'vhole of the bonds re-
nlaining with said board shall be surrendered. But on the 
failure of the Richmond and Alleghany Railroad. Company, 
to complete said railroad within the time prescribed as afore-
said, the said bonds so to be deposited by it as security shall 
be forfeited, and the same, or so many thereof as may re-
main witl1 the board of public works at the time of such for-
feiture, shall be forfeited and delivered by said board to the 
Co1nmonwealth of Virginia. But if from .any unforseen 
casua I ties it should be found impracticable to complete the 
line within the time prescribed, the board of public works 
shall have power to extend the time for a period not exceed-
in~ six months. The first one hundred and six miles of said 
railroad shall be constructed in ten months from the date of 
said contrnct and conveyance, and of s_aid one hundred and 
six n1iles fifty miles shall be belo'v Lynch burg, and :fifty -si~ 
n1ile aoove Lynchburg, and any railroad constructed between 
Buchanan and Clifton Forge shall be counted part of .said 
fifty-six miles above Lynchburg. The surrender of bonds 
above provided for sl1all, so far as said one hundred and six 
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miles are concerned, be limited so that no withdrawal for more 
than fifty n1iles shall be made for construction abovA Lynch-
burg until at least fifty miles below Lynchburg are con-
structed. If the canal from Columbia in Fluvanna County, 
to the first locks above Stillman's mills on the Rivanna river, 
shall be discontinued at any time, said railroad company 
shall within ninety days after said discontinuance, build a 
branch of their road along· the line of said Rivanna River 
from Columbia to the locks aforesaid. 
Fifth. After a final and absolute contract of sale shall 
have been concluded between the James River and Kanawha 
Company and the Richmond and Alleg·hany Railroad Com-
pany, and within ten days after the James River and Kana-
wha Company shall have in 'vriting notified the Richmond 
and Alleg·hany Railroad Company of its readiness 
page 23 ~ to convey all its property and franchises in pur-
suance of such contract, the Richmond and Alle-
ghany Railroad Company shall ~ake the cash payment and 
. deposit hereinbefore required on tender of such conveyance; 
and if such cash payment and deposit shall not then be made, 
the contract of purchase shall be and become absolutely null 
and void; but the said contract must be made within one hun-
dred and twenty days after the passage of this act. 
Sixth. It is hereby provided that the rate of dockage at 
Richmond shall not exceed the rate at present established by 
the James River and Kanawha Company, and all existing 
contracts for water privileges along the entire line shall be 
respected and maintained at rates not exceeding the present 
rates, except in those cases in which they may be cancelled or 
altered by agreement or extinguished by condemnation. It 
shall be the duty of the Richmond and Alleghany Railroad 
Company to maintain the present water supply of the ·docks 
and of the canal along· its line between Bosher's dam and 
tidewater, and along the Lynchburg level between the Water 
'vorks dam (which shall be preserved) above Lynchburg and 
the first lock below Lynchburg, and in the contruction of its 
railroad it shall not so destroy or obstruct the present canal 
between Bosher's dam and tidewater or between the water 
works dam above Lynchburg and the first lock below Lynch-
burg, as to lessen the present water supply. 
Seventh. The maintenance of the canal by the Richmond 
and Alleghany Railrqad Company, so far as required by the 
first and ninth clauses of this first section and the construc-
tion and equipment of said Company of the railroad nerein-
llefore described, within the time herein limited, and the per-
formance by said company of the duties prescribed by the 
sixth clause of this first section, shall be sufficient compliance 
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with all the conditions on which the franchises of the J ame~ 
River. and l{ana,vha Company were here before granted to 
it by the State of Virginia; provided, that nothing contained 
iri this act shall release the Richmond and Alleghany Rail-
road Company from the obligation imposed on the James 
River and Kanawha Company by its charter to maintain form 
bridges over any portion of the canal not filled up, and to 
keep open necessary ditches near the same; and where the 
canal is filled up to permit the privilege of crossing where 
bridges formerly stood, a failure to build said railroad with-
in two years from the date of the expiration of the time above 
prescribed for the completion of· its 'vork, shall work a for-
feiture of said works, property and franchises, and also of 
the works, property and franchises of said railroad company 
to said James River and l{anawha Company; provided, how-
ever, that such forfeiture shall not prejudice the rights of 
any creditor of said railroad company, and upon such for-
feiture said James River and l{anawha Company shall there-
upon be revived and restored as a Corporation, with all of 
its rights, privileges and franchises, just as they existed at 
at the date of the passage of this act. 
page 24 ~ And the Board of Public Works are hereby au-
thorized and required, whenever in their opinion 
such forfeiture shall have occurred, to take the proper steps 
in the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond, by such pro-
ceedings as to .them shall seem best, to have said forfeiture. 
established and declared, and the said Board of Public Works 
shall, upon the adjudication of such forfeiture, take posses-
sion of said works, property and franchises, and hold the 
same until the James River and I{anawha Company shall be 
reorganized, and thereupon turn the same over to said Com-
pany, and the said Board of Public Works shall without de-
lay, cause said Company to be reorganized in conformity with 
laws now in force in regard thereto. 
But nothing herein contained shall be construed as releas-
ing the Richmond and Alleghany Railroad Company from 
any obligation now resting on the James River and l{anawha · 
Company to erect bridges or take earth fillings, and keep 
the same in repair where the said canal crosses the streets 
of any city, if such obligation exists, provided the. City of 
Richmond shall not make any bridge or filling which shall 
obstruct or injure the power or right of said Richmond and 
Alleghany Railroad Company to furnish the water power of 
said Canal to parties desiring to use the same as required by 
the provisions of this act. 
Eig·hth. The said railroad company may, in approaching 
and passing through Lynchburg, arrange for the temporary 
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use of any tracks already constructed, for a .Period not ex-
ceeding three years. 
Ninth. The substitution of a railroad for a canal, as a 
line of commerce, shall be so managed as not to interrupt 
the business of the canal during· the progress of railroad 
constructions on such parts of the canal as are not neces-
sarily occupied by the railroad company at the time of con-
struction. 
Tenth. .All the property acquired or constructed by the 
Richmond and Alleghany Railroad Company, under this act 
or otherwise, shall be subject to taxation in the State of Vir.,. 
ginia, to the same extent and in like manner as that of other 
railroads or canals which are subject to taxation, notwith-
standing· any provision to the contrary in the charter of the 
James River and Kanawha Company or in the Charter of 
any other company to \Vhose rights, privileges or franchises 
the James River and Kanawha Company has succeeded. 
Eleventh. In any mortgage or deed or trust, \Vhich may 
hereafter be executed by said Richmond and Alleghany Rail-
road Company on its works and property, at least one of 
the trustees shall at all times be a resident of the State of 
Virginia. 
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road Company shall have no rights hereunder to 
build any dams in James River not already located, nor shall 
it have any right after the completion of its railroad to charge 
tolls upon the navigation of any part of said river, but may 
charge rents for the use of water derived from its works, as 
is no\V provided by law. 
Thirteenth. The Richmond and Alleghany Railroad Com-
pany shall not charge for tolls on boats, passengers and 
freights upon the canal, so long as the same· or any part there-
of shall be operated by said railroad company, higher rates 
than the maximum rates charged by the James River and 
Kanawha Company, since the fifteenth day of May, eighteen 
hundred and seventy-seven. . 
Fourteenth. When the railroad shall have been substituted 
for the canal, as a line of commerce as contetnplated by this 
act, the Richmond and Alleghany Railroad Company shall 
pay to the owners of all boats then engaged in or fit for regu-
lar business operations on said canal the fair cash value of 
such boats at that time, said value to be ascertained by Com-
missioners, to be appointed on the motion of any boat owner 
after ten days notice to said Richn1ond and .Alleghany Rail- · 
road Company, by the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond, 
for the purpose of assessing and fixing such value; and upon 
the confirmation by said Court of the report of said Commis-
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sioners the said railroad company shall pay into said Court 
the aggregate amount of the values so ascertained; pro-
vided the aggregate amount so required to be paid by said 
railroad company shall not exceed twenty-five thousand dol-
lars, and in the distribution of said aggregate sum, if it be 
not sufficient to pay all the amounts so ascertained, the said 
Court shall give a preference to the owners of such of said 
boats as shall have been engaged in or fit for regular business 
operations on said canal at the time of the execution of the 
contract herein contemplated, and the residue, if any, shall 
be by said court distributed to the owners of such of said 
boats as shall have been put in operation upon the canal sub-
sequent to the execution of said contract, the distribution in. 
each class to be pro rata. And upon the acceptance of said 
ascertained value or of said distributive share, in every case 
the owners of the boat or boats, thus in 'vhole or in part com-
pensated for, shall deliver the same to the said railroad com-
pany, and thereupon the right of property in such boat or 
boats shall vest in said railroad company, but in every case 
in which said ascertained value or said distributive share 
shall not be accepted by boat owners, the said Court shall re.,. 
fund to said R·ichmond and Alleghany Railroad Company 
a corresponding sum of money out of the aggregate ·amount 
so to be paid into Court as aforesaid . 
. Fifteenth. The said Richmond and Alleghany Railroad 
Company, sl1all furnish to the people on the south side of the 
James River for the transportation of persons and produce 
across James River, to the line of their railroads, facilities 
the sa1ne or at least equal to those now affected by the James 
River ·and l{anawha Company. 
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road Company shall, within two years from the 
passage of this act, be required to provide all dams across 
James River from Richmond to the terminus of the line of 
the James River and 1\::anawha Canal ''rith suitable sluices, 
slopes or fish ladders, so that fish may have free passage up 
or down said river during the months of ~larch, April, May 
and June of each year, unless the water during said1nonths be 
so lo'v as not to run over such clams. Said sluices, slopes or 
fish ladders shall be kept in good repair, and ~e restored in 
case of destruction, and be of such plan and construction as 
shall be approved by the fish commissioner of the State. Upon 
the completion with the time specified, of the said sluices, 
slopes or fish ladders, the Richmond and Alleghany Railroad 
Company shall be released from and and all liabilities im-
posed by law upon the James River and Kanawha Company 
for failure to construct the sa1ne, with the approbation of 
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said Fish Commissioner, the time herein specified may be 
extended to not exceeding twelve months. 
2. Before the execution of the contract herein contem-
plated between the Richmond and Alleghany Railroad Com-
pany and the James River and Kanawha Company, there 
shall be a satisfactory agreement and contract made between 
the Richmond and Alleghany Railroad Company and the 
Buchanan and Clifton Forge Railway Corn})any, and said 
agreement and contract shall be made within one hundred and 
twenty days· after the passage of this act. 
3. The Board of Public Works is further invested with 
full authority to institute all suits which may be necessary 
'for the enforcement of said contract and to defend all suits 
which may be brought against the said Board in respect 
thereto. 
4. The Circuit Court of the City of Richmond shall have 
exclusive jurisdiction of all suits in respect to said contract, 
whether brought by the Board of Public "\Vorks or by others; 
and the Board of Public vVorks shall be a necessarv party to 
all such suits. ~ 
5. Upon the final conveyance of the property of the James 
River and Kanawha Company to the Richmond and Alle-
ghany Railroad Company, herein contemplated, the contract 
between the State and the James ·River and Kanawha Com-
pany for the use of convict labor shall cease and determine, 
and the convicts then in the en1ploy of the said company shall 
be returned to and delivered to the superintendent of the 
penitentiary. 
6. The said Richmond and Alleghany Railroad Company 
shall be subject to the exercise of the police power of the 
City of Richmond, notwithstanding any rights claimed un-
der the charter of the James River and l(anawha Company, 
as though it were a corporation no'v for the first time char-
tered. 
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Company shall, as fast as they abandon the said 
canal, so drain the same as not to leave stagnant water, by 
which the health of the citizens along· the line of said canal 
might be injuriously affected. 
8. The General Assembly shall at all times have the right 
to so regulate the charges for local and way travel and 
freight over the route of said Richmond and Alleghany rail-
road as to prevent unjust discrimination ag·ainst such local 
and way travel and freight. 
9. This act shall be in force from its passage. 
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And whereas, the said General Assembly passed another 
act approved the fourth day of ~larch, A. D. 1880, entitled 
''An Act defining the Conditions of Conveyance and Recorda-
tion under any sale the James River and Kanawha Company 
may make of its works and franchises'', which act is in the 
words and figures following, to-wit: 
1. Be it enacted by the General Assemblv of Virginia, that 
in any contract the James River and l{anawha Company may 
make for the sale of its works and franchises it may consent, 
with the approval of the ·Board of Public Works, that iron 
rails may be temporarily laid instead of steel rails, and that 
twelve months' additional time for construction may be given 
for all sections to be laid with steel rails made in Virginia. 
2. Any purchaser of such works and franchises may sell 
the same to the Richmond and Alleghany Railroad Co., or to 
any other Corporation authorized by law to purchase. 
3. The tax upon the recordation of the deed conveying said 
works and franchises, shall be . one thousand two hundred 
and fifty dollars, and if the purchaser shall immedia~ely con-
vey the same to a corporation no additional ta~ shall be re-
quired for recordation. 
4. This act shall be in force from its passage. 
And whereas, the said General Assembly also passed an-
other act approved the fourth day of March A. D. 1880, en-
titled-'' An act authorizing the James River and Kanawha 
Company to sell and convey its works and franchises to the 
Richmond and Alleg·hany Railroad Company'' 'vhich act is in 
the words and figures following, to-wit: 
1. Be it enacted by the General Assembly, that it s4all be 
lawful for the James River and Kanawha Company to sell 
and convey and for the proxies representing the State of 
Virginia, in any Stockholders meeting of said Company, to 
vote for the sale and conveyance of its works, property and 
franchise·s to the Richmond and Alleghany Railroad Com-
pany upon terms and conditions of an act approved Feb-
ruary twenty-seventh, eighteen hundred and seventy-nine, en-
titled an act, and so forth, notwithstanding the limitations 
of said act; provided the said sale and conveyance shall be 
made within five days from the passage of the act. 
2. This act shall be in force from its passage. 
page 28 ~ And whereas the party of the second part has 
contracted to make such purchas~ under the pro-
visions and authority of the said acts aforesaid, and on the 
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terms, conditions provisions and limitations therein set 
forth; 
And whereas, The party hereto of the second part has 
paid to the party hereto of the first part, the sum of thirty 
thousand dollars in cash required to be paid by the second 
clause of the first section of the act recited; ' 
And whereas, The party hereto of the second part has 
deposited with the Board of Public vVorks the sum of five 
hundred thousand dollars in market value in United States 
bonds required by the fourth clause of the first section of the 
act hereinbefore recited; 
And whereas, before the execution of this conveyance a 
satisfactory ag-reement and contract has been made between 
the party of the second part and the Buchanan and Clifton 
Forge Railway Company, and the sun1 of four thousand dol-
lars as required by said contract has been paid by the party 
hereto of the s~cond part, to the said Buchanan and Clifton 
Forge Hailway Company. No'v this deed, Witnesseth, that 
for and in consideration of the premises and in pursuance 
of the Acts of Assembly aforesaid, and in consideration there-
of, and of the terms, conditions, provisions and limitations 
tbP.rein contained, the e.T ames River and l{anawha Company 
doth hereby grant and convey unto the said Richmond and 
Alleghany Railroad Company, all the works, property and 
franchises of the said J an1es River and Kanawha Company, 
including all the lands, buildings, canals, basins, tow· paths, 
embank1nents, bridges, da1ns, locks, turnpikes, estates and 
interests, in turnpikes, roads; toll houses, docks, 'vharves, 
ferries, ferry houses, ferryboats, the North River and 
Rivanna improveinents, canal boats, materials, tolls, ma-
chh~ery, l1orses, n1ules, dredging 1nachines, and all the rights, 
water power, water rights, privileges, and franchises of the 
said James River and l{anawha Company, and all with other 
property, real, personal or nlixed, belonging or appertaining 
to the said canals, wharves and docks, or connected 'vith the 
proper equip•nent: operation or cond'uct thereof; and all tolls, 
income, igsues and profits to he had or derived from the prop-
erty, works, rights, privileges and franchises hereby con-
veyed or any of them and all right to receive or recover the 
same, to have and to hold the property, works, rig4ts, pl'ivi-
leges and franchises hereby conveyed, 'vith all and singular 
the said appurtenances, tolls, rents, issues and profits unto 
the said party hereto, of the second part, its successors and 
assigns forever. 
Each of the parties to this deed hereby binds it:;elf. its 
successors and assign to the full and faithful performance 
and fulfillment on it part of all the requirements imposed 
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on said parties respeetively by the acts hereinbefore recited. 
A schedule of thP. debts and obligations of the James Riyer 
and Kanawha Company which is required by the first clause 
of the first section of the act first herein recited, is hereto ap-
r:ended, and is made a part of this dectl. 
The party of the first part doth warrant generally the 
property here by conveyed. 
In testimony 'vhereof the parties hereto have caused their 
respective corporate seals to be hereto affixed and these pres-
Ants to be signed by their respective presidents, 
page 29 ~ the day and year first herein written. 
TT:IE J AlVIES RIVER AND KANAWHA COMPANY, 
(Seal) By JNO. W. tTOHNSTON, President. 
THE RICHMOND AND ALLEGHANY R+ULRO~D 
COMPANY, 
(Seal) By GEO. ~I. BAR.THOLOMEvV, President. 
Attorney General's Office 
Richmond, March 4th, 1880. 
The foregoing contract of sale and conveyance between 
the James River and Kanawha Company and the Richmond -
and Alleghany Railroad Company, has been submitted to me, 
and upon an examintion of said proposed contract; I find that 
the .Acts of the General Assemblv under which it is made are 
inserted in the contract and made a part thereof, and that 
said contract is in all respeC'ts in compliance with the terms 
of said acts. 
Given under my hand this day and year ~bove written. 
State of Virginia, 
JAS. G. FIELD, 
Attorney General. 
City of Richmond, to-wit: 
I, Solomon Cutchins, a Notary Public in and for the City 
aforesaid, in the State of Virginia, do certify that John W. 
Johnston, President, and Geo. ~I. Bartholomew, President, 
whose names are signed to the writing above, bearing date 
on the 4th day of 1\ia.rch 1880, having severally acknowledged 
the· same before me in n1y City aforesaid. 
Given under my hand this 4th day of March, 1880. 
(Seal) SOLOMON CUTCHINS, N. P. 
50 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
page 30 ~ SCHED1JLE 
of the debts and oblig·ations of the James River and Kana-
wha Company appended to the foregoing deed, and to be 
taken as part thereof. 
1st. Old floating debt, all due prior to ~lay 1867, with in-
ternst calculated to 1\Iarch 1st, 1879. 
(a) Bonds of the North River Navigation Company $1,000.00 
Interest on same to 1 ~larch 1879 1,400.00 
(b) Bills payable 3,643.00 
Interest on same to 1 J\iiarch 1879 5,263.65 
(c) Pay rolls and open accounts 3,500.00 
I11terest on sa1ne to 1 l\iarch 1879 2,897.50 
(d) Hire of Hands, not on pay rolls 2,900.00 
Tnt<:! rest on same to 1 1viarch 1879 2, 718.50 
''.rotal of this class $23,322.65 
No claim has been made on the Company for any of the 
ab~)ve dP.bts so far as known by the present officers of the 
Cornpany since the year 1867 or for son1e time before that 
date. 
2nd. Balance of 8 per cent, bonds issued in 1856: 
Principal 
Interest on same to 1st l\Iarch 1880 
Total of this class 
3rd. First mortgag·e bonds, dated 1\fay 1867 : 





Nov. 1879 (approxbnate) 12~,736 875,736.00 
Second mortgage bonds) dated Nov. 9th, 
1870 Principal 227,400 
Unpaid coupons, up to and including 
Nov. 1879 (approximate) 35,450 262,850.00 
Third mortgage bonds, dated Sept. 1st, 
1877 Principal (all held by Buchanan 
& Clifton Fbrge R. W. Co.) 248.000 
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Unpaid coupons, up to and including 
March 1880 7,440 $255,440.00 
Totals of the three mortgage debts $1,394,026.00 
4th. Thirty thousand dollars of the second mortgage bonds 
of the Company have been pledged to the State of Virginia, 
as security for the return of the convicts and as security 
for the payment of the penalty for the escape of convicts. 
Ten thousand dollars of the second mortgage 
page 31 ~ bonds are pledged as collateral for the debt of 
$5,000 to the supervisors of the county of Rock-
bridge, mentioned in the 7th class of this Schedule. 
Three thousand dollars of second mortgage bonds, belong-
ing to Jordan, Ballard & Co., contractors, are retained by 
this Company as security for their compliance with their 
contract for the return of convicts hired to them by the Com-
pany, and for compliance with the other provisions of said 
contract in reference to said convicts. 
5th. The Guaranteed Debt-This debt consists of bonds of 
the Company guaranteed by the State of Virginia. Under 
the provisions of the Act of Assembly of March 1860, the pay-
ment of these debts was assumed by the State, in considera-
tion of the issue to the State of preferred stock of the Com-
pany. 
Principal of bonds outstanding $122,580.00 
Interest matured to 1st J any. 1880, per state-
ment of Auditor of State of Virginia 53,576.78 
Total of this class $216,156.78 
6th. Debt to the State of Virginia for maintenance of con-
victs: 
Bond December 15, 1878, at 5 years bearing in-
terest from date 
Bond December 15, 1879, at 5 years bearing in-
tm·est from date 




Total of this class $87,407.40 
7th. (a.) Bond to the City of Lynchburg for 
loan secured by pledge of water rents on the 
Lynch burg level, 35,000.00 
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On 30th September 1879 it was claimed by the City of 
Lynchburg that a balance of $796.53 of interest on this bond 
was due, but the account is unsettled. 
(b) Bond to the County of Rockbridge for loan, 
subject to written contract under which the 
company claims that this debt is payable only 
and solely from the net revenues of the North 
River Oanal, which claim is deputed by 
County 
Interest to. date, approximate 




A contract has been entered into between the James River 
and l{anawha Company and the Board of Supervisors of 
the County of Rockbridg·e by which the debt above stated, 
of $50,000.00 and its interest, is released, subject to the con-
dition that a railroad is completed to the town of Lexington 
as set forth in said contract. 
8. Salaries and wag·es of officers and employees, and 
debts, charges, costs and expenses incurred in the adminis-
tration of the Company since 1st May 1867, other than those 
included in the foregoing clauses: 
(a) Pay rolls and salaries (estimated) $8,500.00 
(b) Outstanding due bills · for first mortgage 
bonds 1,205.00 
Interest on same to 1st March, 1880 517.30 
(c) Supervisors of Rockbridge County, ten 
bonds for $500 each for a loan 5,000.00 
InterP.st on same to ~larch 1st, 1880 450.00 
(d) Open account for supplies, counsel fees, 
printing (estimated) 14,000.00 
Total of this class $29,672.30 
9th. The company claims the right to add any debt omitted 
·by inadv~rtence, and to correct any inaccuracy in this Sched-
ule inadvertently made. 
lOth. Among the debts of the James River and Kanawha 
Company provided for by the 9th Section of foregoing sched-
ule of debts, omitted by inadvertence, are to be included com-
pensation for boats designed for use on the canal, the con-
struction of which has been commenced or completed in pur-
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suance of resolutions approved by the stockholders of the 
Jam~s River and l{anawha Co., in g·eneral meeting on the 
1st day of July, 1879, such compensation to be equivalent 
to the equitable value of all such boats as have been so com-
menced or completed, under the express written sanction of 
the President of said James River and Kanawha Company,· 
prior to the conveyance from the James River and Kanawha 
. Company to the Richmond arid Alleghany Railroad Com-
pany. 
City of Richmond, to-wit: 
In the Office of the Court of Chancery for the said City, 
the 5th day of J\tiarch 1880. 
This deed was presented, and with the certificates and 
schedule annexed, admitted to record at half past five o'clock 
P. :NI. 
Teste: 
BENJ. H. BE·RRY, Clerk. 
A copy, teste: · 
CHAS. 0. SA VILLE, Clerk. 
page 32 ~ Exhibit No. 3, filed with Bill. 
An Indenture, made the twentieth day of May, 1889, by 
a.nd between E. R. Lelan'd, a Special Commissioner of the 
Circ·uit Court of the City of Richmond, in the State of Vir-
ginia, duly appointed in the suits in Chancery hereinafter 
mentioned, party of the first part, and Erwin Davis, Charles 
.F. Cox, and J. Kennedy Tod, parties of the second part. 
Whereas, on or about the twenty-third day of June, 1883, 
Ashbel Green and Thomas S. Bocock, as Trustees, did com-
mence a suit in Chancery in said Circuit Court of the City of 
R.ichmond, ag·ainst the Richmond and Alleghany Railroad· 
Company and others for the foreclosure of a certain deed of 
trust or mortgage, executed and delivered by the said Rich-
mond and Alleghany R-ailroad Company to the said Ashbel 
Green and Thomas S. Bocock, as trustees, under date of the 
twenty-seventh day of April, 1881; and a supplementary deed 
of trust or mortgag·e also executed and delivered by the said 
company to the same trustees und~r date of the twenty-fourth 
day of May, 1881, which said deeds of trust or mortgages 
are fully set forth and copies thereof filed in the said suit; 
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and whereas, after the institution of said snit the· said .A:shbel 
Green resigned his office as trustee and Herbert L. Terrell 
'vas appointed as trustee in his stead, and the said suit was 
duly revived in the name of the said Herbert L. Terrell as 
complainant in the place of said Ashbel Green, and there-
after proceeded with in his name; and whereas, on or about 
the ... day of October, 1883, Henry 1\.L Alexander and Henry 
K. Ellyson, as Trustees, did commence a snit in chancery 
in the said Circuit Court of the City of Richmond, against 
the said Richn1ond and Alleghany Railroad Company and 
others, for the foreclosure of a certain deed of trust or mort-
gage, executed and delivered by the said Richmond and Alle-
ghany RaiJroad Company to the said Henry M. Alexander 
and Henry 1{. Ellyson, as trustees under date of the fifth day 
of March, 1880, which said deed of trust or mortgage is fully 
set forth and a copy thereof filed in said suit; and whereas, 
the suits were, by a decree entered therein by the said Cir-
cuit Court, on the twentieth day of June, 1884, ordered to 
be thereafter heard together; and whereas, such proceedings 
were had in the said suits from time to time, that, on the 
nineteenth day of December 1888, a decree of foreclosure and 
sale was entered in the said suits bv the said Circuit Court 
of the City of Richmond; and whereas, in and by the said 
decree, the said E. R. Leland was appointed a Sp~cial Com-
missioner to make the sale provided for and directed by said 
decree, and in pursuance of such appointment, did afterwards, 
to-wit: on the sixteenth day of .April, 1889, after the advertise-
ment and notice prescribed in the said decree, sell at public 
auction, at the place named in said decree, in the City of Rich-
mond, all and singular the property, premises, rights, privi-
leges and franchises, which the said Special Commissioner 
was directed by the said decree fully and at large set forth, 
to which decree reference is hereby specially and expressly 
made; and wl~ereas, at such sale the said Erwin Davis, 
Charles F. Cox and J. Kennedy Tod, styling themselves a 
committee of purchase for themselves and others, became the 
purchasers thereof for the sum of five million dol-
page 33 ~ Iars ( $5,000,000) ; and whereas, afterwards the 
said Special Commissioner did duly make his re-
port of said sale to the said Court, and the said sale was duly 
approved and confirmed by the said Court; and Whereas, 
an order was made by the said Court, in the said suits on 
the . . day of ........ , 1889, authorizing and directing the 
said E. R. Leland, Commissioner, the party of the first, as 
Special Commissioner, upon the terms and conditions set out 
in the said order, to execute and deliver a conveyance of all 
and singular the property, premises, rights, privileges and 
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franchises so sold to the said purchasers thereof, subject to 
the liens specified in the fifth, eighth, ninth, tent~ and eleventh 
paragraphs of the said decree of the nineteenth of December, 
1888, so far as the liens mentioned in the said fifth, eighth, 
ninth, tenth and eleventh paragraphs affect the particular 
property and premises mentioned in the said paragraphs, 
and subject to all lawful and binding contracts, obligations 
and liabilities of every kind of the Receivers or receiver in 
the said causes, as well as those made, entered into or in-
curred by them or him in their or his o'vn name, as those made, 
entered into and incurred by them or him in the name of the 
Richmond and Alleg·hany Railroad Company, subject also to 
the various contracts, agreements, leases and deed entered 
into by the Receivers or Receiver, under the authority of de-
crees in the said causes, with persons or corporations, re-
fP.rred to in the thirteenth parag·raph of the said decree of 
the nineteenth of December, 1888, the purchasers to take the 
premises, subject to and 'vith the obligation to abide, keep 
and perform all the terms and stipulations of said contracts, 
agreements, leases and deeds in all respects ; and subject also 
to the payment of the bond of two hundred thousand dollars 
($200,000) executed by the parties of the second part, as pro-
vided in the nineteenth paragraph of the said decree of the 
nineteenth of December, 1888, and of the bond for a like 
amount to be substituted in its place by the corporation re-
sulting from the sale and this conveyance; and subject also 
to the payment of the bond for one hundred thousand dollars 
executed by the said parties of the second part, payable- to 
La,vrence Myers and Decatur Axtel for the further indemnity 
of the Receivers or Receiver in these causes; and subject to 
the bond for a like amount to be substituted in the place of 
the last named bond by the corporation resulting from the 
sale and this conveyance; and whereas, the said purchasers 
have complied with and fulfilled the terms and conditions of 
the said order; and "'11ereas, the said purchasers, will, upon 
the due execution and delivery of these presents by force of 
the statute in such case made and provided, forthwith be 
and become a corporation by any name which may be herein 
set forth; and, Whereas, under and in pursuance of the said 
statute the said purchasers, parties hereto of the second part, 
have declared, and do herein and hereby declare, that the 
said name by which they shall, by force of the said statute be-
come a cerporation, is and shall be the Richmond and 
Alleghany Railroad Company, and, Whereas, it is the intent 
and meaning of these presents that this conveyance shall 
enure to the use, benefit and advantage of the said corpora-
tion so designated and described; 
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. Now,- Therefore, this Indenture Witnesseth: 
page 34 r TQ.at .the said E. R. Leland, Special Commissioner 
as aforesaid, party hereto of the :first part, in con-
sideration of the premises and of fiye million dollars ($5,-
000,000) in hand paid, or secured to be paid, hath granted, 
bargained, sold, aliened, assigned, released and confirmed, and 
by these presenth doth grant, bargain, sell, alien, assign, re-
lease and confirm 'vith special warranty unto the said Erwin 
Davis, Charles F. Cox, and J. l{ennedy Tod for the use, benefit 
and advantage of the said corporation, which is hereby cre-
ated under the name and style of the . Richmond and Alle-
g•hany Railway Company, all and singular, the rights, privi-
leges, interest, franchises, lands, tenements, hereditaments, 
appurtenances and property of every description, whether 
real, personal or mixed embraced or included, in the said 
decree of sale, and the sale pursuant thereto, that is to say, 
the entire railroad of the said Richmond and Alleghany Rail-
road Company, extending from the City of Richmond, in the 
County of Henrico, and State of Virginia, by way of Lynch-
burg·, in the County of Campbell, to Buchanan, in the County 
of Botetourt, and thence to Clifton Forge, in the ·County of 
Alleg·hany; and all branches and extensions of the said rail-
toad, including its North River or Lexington Branch and its 
Rivanna River Branch, and including also the railroad ac-
quired by the Richmond and Alleghany Railroad Company 
from the Buchanan and Clifton Forge Railroad Company; and 
all lands, tenements and hereditaments belonging to, or ac-
quired by the said Richmond. and Alleghany Railroad Com-
pany; and all easements and appurtenances thereunto belong-
ing, or in any wise appertaining·, and all railways, ways and 
rig·hts of way, depot grounds, tracts, bridges, viaducts, cui-
. verts, fences and other structures, depots, station houses, en-
gine houses, car houses, freight houses, wood houses, ware 
houses, machine shops, super-structures, buildings, erections, 
fixtures of every kind and nature whatsoever; leaseholds, 
leases, rights under leases, or under contracts, covenants, or 
agreen1ents, terms or parts of terms, acquired, owned, held or 
used for the use or purpose of the said Richmond and Alle-
ghany Raiload Company, or its branches or any of them, or 
in connection tl1ere,vith, or the businesH thereof; and a111oco-
motives, engines, tenders, cars and other rolling stock and 
equipments; and all rails, ties machinery, tools, implements, 
fuel and material whatsoev·er; and all other property, real, 
personal or mixed, acquired, held or used for or in connection 
with the constru~tion, operation, maintenance, reparation or 
replacement of the said railroad, or any part thereof; and 
• I 
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all the rights, privileges, franchises and immunities of eve'.l"y 
kind and nature of the said Richmond and Alleghany Railroad 
Company; and also all the. property, works and franchises 
'vhich were acquired from the James River and J{anawha Com-
pany, together with all the rights, water power, water rights, 
privileges and franchises conveyed to the said Richmond and 
Alleghany Railroad Company by the said James River and 
Kanawha Company; also all the property and premises lying 
and being in the City of Manchester, in the County of ·Ches-
terfield, in the State of Virginia, on the south side of the 
James River, and between the said river and the track of the 
Richmond and Danville Railroad Company, extending from 
the head wall or gate of the ::.Manchester Canal to Walker's 
Creek; and also the said !.'Ianchester Canal, with all rights, 
easements and appurtenances belonging to said premises, or 
in any wise, thereunto appertaining; and also the bridge 
across James River at New Canton, Buckingham· County, 
State of Virginia, and certain lands and premises adjacent 
thereto, more particularly described in a deed of 
page 35 } the nineteenth of J nne, 1883, executed by Virginius 
Newton, a more full and particular description of 
the property hereby intended to be conveyed being contained 
in the said decree of the nineteenth of December, 1888, to 
which reference is hereby made; it being intended to convey 
all and singular the premises, rights, privileges and fran-
chises embraced in the 1nortgage, or deed of trust, to the said 
Henry M. Alexander and Henry K. Ellyson, Trustees, exe-
cuted by. the Richmond and Alleghany Railroad Company, 
bearing date on the :fifth day of March, 1880; and all and 
singular the premises, rights, privileges and franchises em-
braced in the mortgages or deeds of trust to Ashbel Green 
and Thomas Bocock, executed by the said Richmond and Al-
leghany Railroad Company, bearing date on the twenty-sev .. 
enth.day of April, 1881, and the twenty-fourth of May, 1881; 
and all and singular the premises, rights, privileges, and 
franchises ·embraced in the deed from Charles C. Deming to 
the said Richmond and Alleghany Railroad Company, bear-
ing date on the 12th day of July, 1883; and all the premises, 
rights, privileges and franchises embraced in a certain deed 
poll, executed by Virginius Newton. bearing date on the nine-
teenth day. of June, 1883; and all other property of every kind· 
and description, if any, of which said Richmond and Alle-
ghany Railroad Company was possessed, or to which it was 
entitled at the time of the said sale in accordance with the 
statute in such case made and prov~ded, and the terms of the 
mortgages or deeds of trust executed by said company. To 
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have and hold, all and singular, the above-mentioned prem-
ises, rights, privileges, interests, franchises, lands, tenements, 
hereditaments, appurtenances an:d property of every descrip-
tion, whether real, personal or mixed, herein conveyed, unto 
the said Erwin Davis, Charles F. Cox and J. Kennedy Tod, 
for the use, benefit and advantage of the said Richmond and 
Alleghany Railway Company, subject, however, to the liens 
specified in the fifth, eig·hth, ninth, tenth and eleventh para-
graphs of the said decree of the nineteenth of December, 
1888, so far as the liens n1entioned in the said fifth, eighth, 
ninth, tenth and eleventh paragraphs affect the particular 
property and premises mentioned in said paragraphs and sub-
ject to all lawful and binding contracts, obligations, and lia-
bilities of every kind of the Receivers or Receiver in the said 
causes, as 'veil as those made, entered into or incurred by them, 
or him, in their or his own nan1e, as those made, entered into 
or incurred by them or him in the name of the Richmond and 
Alleghany Raiload Company; subject also to the various con-
tracts, agreements, leases and deeds entered into by the Re-
ceivers or Receiver, under the authority of decrees in the 
said causes with persons or corporations referred to in the 
thirteenth paragraph of the said decree, it being understood 
that purchaser shall take the premises hereby conveyed and 
every part thereof, subject to and with the obligation, to abide, 
keep and perform all the terms and stipulations of such con-
tracts, leases, agreements, and deeds in all respects, and sub-
ject to the payment of the bond for two hundred thousand 
dollars ( $200,000) executed by the parties of the second part, 
as provided in the nineteenth paragraph of the said decree; 
and to the payment of the bond for like amount to be substi-
tuted in its place by the corporation resulting from the sale 
and this conveyance; and subject 'to the payment of the bond 
for one hundred thousand dollars ( $100,000), executed by 
said parties of the second part, and payable to Lawrence 1\fy-
ers and Decatur Axtel, for the further indemnity of the Re-
ceivers or Receiver in the said causes· and to the 
pag·e 36 ~ payment of the bond for a like amount to be sub-
stituted in its place by the corporation resulting 
from the sale and this conveyance. And the premises hereby 
conveyed, and every part of the same, are hereby expressly 
· charged with a lien to secure the performance and payment 
of all lawful contracts and liabilities made or incurred, by the 
Receivers or Receiver in these_ causes, and to secure the 
payment of the bond for two hundred thqusand dollars 
($200,000), executed by the parties of the second part, pur-
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nineteenth of December, 1888, and of the bond of like amount 
to be substituted in its place by the said Richmond and Al-
leghany Railway Company, and of the bond for one hundred 
thousand dollars ( $100,000) executed by the said parties of 
the second part for the further indemnity of the Receivers 
or Receiver in these causes and. of the bond of like amount to 
be substituted in its place by the said Richmond and Alle-
ghany Railway Company, and to indemnify and save harm-
less the Receivers or Receiver in these causes from all loss 
or damag·e in respect to any contract or liability 'vhatsoever 
made or incurred by them or him, it being expressly under-
stood and agreed that, the said purchasers have assumed, and 
do hereby assume, all the outstanding lawful liabilities and 
contracts of the said Receivers or Receiver. 
In witness whereof, the parties hereto have hereunto set 
their hands and seals the day and year first above written. 
E. R. LELAND, (Seal) 
Special Commissioner. 
EHWIN DAVIS, (L. S.) 
C. F. COX, (L. S.) 
J. KENNEDY TOD. (L. S.) 
State of Virginia, 
City of Richmond, to-wit: 
I, C. E. Wellford, a Notary Public for the ·City aforesaid, 
in the State of Virginia, do certify that E. R. Leland, Spe-
cial Commissioner, Erwin Davis, Charles F. Cox and J. Ken-
nedy Tod, whose names are signed to the foregoing writing 
bearing date on the twentieth day of May, 1889, have ac-
knowledged the same before me in my city aforesaid. 
·Giv-en under my hand and notarial seal this twentieth day of 
May, 1889. 
Virginia : ss : 
C. E. WELLFORD, 
Notary Public. 
In the Clerk's Office of County Court of Henrico· Co., the 
3rd day of June, 1889. 
page 37 ~ The foregoing deed from E. R. Leland, Special 
Commissioner, to Erwin Davis, Charles F. Cox 
and J. I{ennedy Tod, dated the twentieth day of 1\{ay, 1889, 
was this day presented in this office, with certificates of ac-
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knowledgment thereto annexed, and admitted to record (the 
tax thereon of $5,000.00 having been "first paid) at 11 o'clock 
A. J\II. 
Teste: 
SAl\fUEL P. WADDILL, Clerk. 
Virginia : ss : 
In the Clerk's Office of the Chancery Court of the City of 
Richmond, the 3rd · day of J nne, 1889. 
The foregoing deed from E. R. Leland, Special Commmis .. 
sioner, to Erwin Davis, Charles F. Cox and J. I{ennedy Tod, 
dated the twentieth day of ~fay, 1889, was this day presented 
in said Office, with certificates of acknowledgement thereto 
annexed and admitted to record at four o'clock P. M. 
Teste: 
CHAS. W. GODDIN, Clerk. 
pag·e 38 ~ EXHIBIT NO. 4, FILED WITH BILL. 
This Indenture made this twentieth day of January, 1890, 
between the Richmond and Alleghany R.ailway Company, a 
corporation created bv and existing· under the la-ws of Vir-
ginia, of the one part," and the Chesapeake and Ohio Railway 
Company, a corporation created by and existing under the 
laws of Virginia and West Virginia of the other part. 
Whereas, by an agreement bearing date the first day of 
August, 1888, between C. H. Co~ter, R. J. Crop, and Anthony 
I. Thomas, reorganization committee of the stockholders, 
bondholders and other creditors of the Chesapeake and Ohio 
Railway Company and Erwin Davis, George F. Baker, Smith 
Clift, James T. Closson, Charles ],. Cox, Francis 0. French, 
Charles M. Fry, John J. lVIcCook, and J. l(ennedy Tod, re-
org·anization committee of the Richmond and Alleghany Rail-
road Company it was agreed that the Chesapeake and Ohio 
Railway Company should take over the railroad and property 
of all kinds of the Richmond and Alleghany Railroad Com-
pany so soon as in the opinion of counsel such transfer could 
lawfully be made as in the opinion of counsel such transfer 
could lawfully be made by purchase, lease, merger, consolida-
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tion, or in some other manner upon certain terms in said 
agreement particularly stated. 
And whereas, the property of the Richmond and All~ghany 
Railroad Company, was thereafter sold under foreclosure pro-
ceedings had in the Circuit Court of the City of Rjchmond. 
And whereas in pursuance of the Statutes of Virginia in 
such case made and provided, the said purchasers did become 
a co_rporation under the corporate name of the Richmond and 
.Alleghany Railway Company and, as such did become pos ... 
sessed of all the railroads, properties, rights and franchises 
of the Richmond and Alleghany Railroad Company. 
And whereas, by agreement bearing date the twentieth 
day of May, 1889, between the Richmond and Alleghany Rail-
way Company, the Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Company, 
C. H. Coster, R. J. Crop, and Anthony I. Thomas reorganiza-
tion committee of the stockholders, bondholders and other 
creditors of the Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Company and 
Erwin Davis, George F. Baker, Smith Clift, James T. Closson, 
Charles F. Cox, Francis 0. French, Charles M. Fry, John J. 
J.\lfcCook, and J. l{ennedy Tod, reorganization committee of 
the Richmond and Alleghany Railroad Company, the said cor-
poration ratified and adopted the provisions of the agreement 
theretofore made between said reorganization committees un-
der date of the first day of August, 1888. 
page 39 ~ And Whereas, by an Act of the General As-
sembly of the State of Virginia, e·ntitled ''An 
Act authorizing the union of the Chesapeake and Ohio Rail-
way Company, and the Richmond and Alleghany Railway 
Company, by purchase consolidation or merger, and the issue 
of additional stock and bonds for that purpose", approved 
the eighteentp. day of December, 1889, it was enacted, that it 
shall he lawful for the Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Com-
pany and the Richmond and Alleghany Railway Company 
(which last mentioned company has succeeded to all the 
rights, privileges, franchises and property of the Richmond 
and Alleghany Railroad Company) to unite with each other 
under any contract which may have been or may be entered 
into by and between the said Chesapeake and Ohio Railway 
Company and said Richmond and Alleghany Railway Com-
pany, and which may have been or may be approved by a ma-
jority in interest of the stockholders of the said companies 
~espectively, for the purchase of the rights, privileg·es and 
property of the latter by the former company, or for the con-
solidation of said companies or for the merger of one of them 
into the other, and in the event of said purchase, consolida-
tion or merger, the Chesapeake and Ohio R.ailway Company, 
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shall be entitled to and shall have and possess, all the rights, 
privileges, franchises and property of the Richmond and Al-
leghany Railway Con1pany. 
2. In the event of said purchase, consolidation or merger 
it shall be lawful for the Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Com-
pany for the purpose of carrying the same into effect, to is-
sue its first pref-erred stock to an amount not exceeding one 
million dollars, in addition to that now authorized by law, 
and its common stock to an amount not exceeding six mil-
lion dollars, in addition to the amount now authorized by la,v, 
and for this purpose it may also issue bonds on the railway 
property and franchises so acquired, to be secured by one 
or more mortgages thereon. 
3. In the event of such purchase, consolidation or merger 
the Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Comt)any shall assume 
all the lawful debts and obligations of the Richmond and Al-
leghany Railway Company, and it shall be lawful for the hold-
ers of all such debts and obligations to enforce the same di-
rectly ag·ainst the Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Company 
with the same force and effect as they lawfully could be in-
forced against the Richmond and Alleghany Railway Com-
pany, ~ubject however to the right of the Chesapeake and 
Ohio Railway Company, to make all and any defence in law 
or in fact which the said Richmond and Alleghany Railway 
C~nnpany, 'vould have the right to make to the same. 
4. In the event of such purchase, consolidation or merger 
the Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Company, shall pay all 
taxes, possessed upon its property or upon the property ac-
quired fro1n the Richn1ond and Alleghany Railway Company 
in lawful money and not in coupons. 
5. This act shall be in force from its passage and 
page 40 ~ whereas, The tel'IDS and provisions of this agree-
ment have been approved by a majority in interest 
of the stockholders in Each of said companies respectively. 
Now, this indenture witnesseth, that· the Richmond Rail-
way Company for and in consideration of the. premises and 
of bonds of the Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Company, to 
the amount of six million dollars, which said bonds, are known 
aA the ''First Consolidated JYiortgage Gold Bonds, of the 
Che~apeake and Ohio Railway Company, on its Richmond and 
.Alleghany Railway Division, and are secured by mortgage to 
the Central Trust Company, of New York, a Corporation of 
tb~ State of New York and Henry T. Wickham of Hanover 
County, Virginia, Trustees, bearing· even date herewith and 
of certain other bonds of the Chesapeake and Ohio Railway 
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Company, to the amount of one million dollars, which said 
bonds are known as the Second Consolidated 1\Iortgage Gold 
Bonds of the Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Company, on its 
Richmond and Alleghany Railway Division, and are secured 
by mortgage to the said Central Trust Company, of New 
York and Henry T. Wickham, Trustees bearing even date 
herewith, and also ten thousand shares of the first preferred 
stock of the Chesapeake a.nd Ohio Railway Company of the 
par value of One 1\Hllion Dollars, and sixty thousand shares 
of the common stock of the Chesapeake and Ohio Railway· 
Company of the par value of six million dollars (which said 
bonds and stocks are to be disposed of in accordance with the 
terms of the s'aid agreement of August 1st, 1888, between C. 
H. Coster and others, Co1nmittee and Erwin Davis and others, 
Committee and of the said agreement of May 20, 1889, be-
tween the Richmond and Alleghany Railway Company and 
Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Company, C. H. Coster and 
others, Committee and Erwin Davis and other Committee) 
hath granted, bargained and sold, aliened, remised, released 
and confirmed and by these presents doth grant, bargain and 
sell, alien, remise, release, and confirm unto the Chesapeake 
and Ohio Railway Company its successors and Assig'Ds, all 
the line of railway of it, the Richmond and Alleghany Rail-
way Company, being a line of railroad extending· from the 
City of Richmond, in the County of Henrico and State of 
Virginia, by way of Lynchburg in the County of Campbell to 
Buchanan in the County of Botetourt and thence to Clifton 
Forg-e in the County of Alleghany and all branches and ex-
tensions of the said railroad including its North River or 
Lexington Branch, and its Rivanna River Branch and includ-
ing also the railroad acquired by the Richmond and Alleghany 
Railroad Company fro1n the Buchanan and Clifton Forge 
Railway Company; and all lands, tenements and heredita-
ments belonging to or acquired by the said Richmond and 
Alleghany Railroad Company, and all easements and appur-
tenances thereto belonging or in any wise appertaining and 
a.ll railways, ways and rights of way, depot ground tracks, 
bridges, bridges viaducts, culverts, fences, and other struc-
tures, depots, station houses, engine houses, car houses, freight 
houses, woodhouses, warehouses, machine shops, super-
structures buildings, erections, fixtures, of every kind and na-
ture whatsoever leaseholds, leases, rights under leases or 
under contracts covenants or agreements, terms or parts of 
terms acquired, owned held or used for. the purpose, of the 
said Richmond and Alleghany Railroad Company, or its 
branches or any of them or in connection therewith or the 
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business thereof, and all locomotives, engines, tenders cars, 
and other rolling stock and equipment and all rails 
pag·e 41 ~ ties machinery tools implements fuel and material 
whatsoever, and all other property real personal 
or mixed acquir~d held or used for or in connection with the 
the construction operation maintenance reparation or re-
placement of the said railroad or any part thereof, and all 
rights, privileges, franchises and immunities of every kind 
and nature of the said Richmond and Alleghany Railway 
·Company and also all the property works and franchises 
which were acquired from the James River and Kana,vha 
Company, together with all the rights water power, water 
rights, privileges, and franchises conveyed to the said Rich-
mond and Alleghany Railroad Company by the said James 
River and Kanawha Company, also all the property and 
premises lying and being in the City of l\ianchester in the 
County of Chesterfield in the State of Virginia on the south 
side of the James River and between the said river and the 
track of the Richmond and Danville Railroad Company ex-
tending from the head wall .or gate of the l\fanchester canal 
to Walker's Creek, .and also the said ~fanchester-Canal with 
all rights, easements, and appurtenances belonging to said 
premises, or in any wise thereunto appertaining and also 
the bridge across the ,James River at .New Canton, Bucking-
ham County, State of Virginia, and certain lands, and prem-
ises adjacent thereto, more particularly described a deed of 
the 19th of June, 1883, executed by ·virginius Newton, a more 
full and particular description of the property intended to 
be conveyed, being contained in the decree entered on the 19th 
day of December, 1888, in the said Circuit Court of the City 
of Richmond in the suits of Herbert L. Terrell and Thomas 
S. Bocock, Trustees, against the Richmond and Alleghany 
Railroad Company aJ?.d others and Henry J\II. Alexander and 
Henry K. Ellison, Trustees, against the Richmond and Alle-
ghany Railroad Company and other to which decree reference 
is hereby made. 
It being intended hereby to convey all and singular the · 
railways, premises, rights, privileges, and franchises of 
which a sale was had under said decree, and also all and singu-
lar the railways, pren1ises rights, privileges and franchises 
conveyed by an indenture bearing date the twentieth day of 
May, 1889, made between E. R. Leland, a special commis-
sioner of the Circuit ·Court of the City of Richmond, in the 
State of Virginia, and Erwin Davis, Charles F. Cox, and J~ 
Kennedy Tod, including herein all the reversionary right of 
said Richn~tOnd and Alleghany Railway Company, in any as-
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sets now or hereafter held by Erwin Davis, and others, the 
reorganization committee of the Richmond and Alleghany 
Railroad Company, hereinbefore recited, and also including all 
additions to said railways, premise, rights, privileges and 
franchises. 
To have and to hold, the railways properties and franchises 
above described to the said Chesapeake and Ohio Railway 
Company its successors and assigns to and for the only use 
and behoof of the said Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Com-
pany its successors and assigns. 
Subject however to the payment of the said First Consoli-
dated Mortgage Gold Bonds, of the Chesapeake and Ohio Rail-
way Company, on its Richmond and Alleghany Railway di-
vision to the amount of six million dollars, and also to the 
payment of the said second consolidated mortgage 
page 42 ~ Gold Bonds of the Chesapeake and Ohio Railway 
Company, on its Richmond and .Alleghany Division 
to the amount of one million dollars. 
And the Richmond and Alleghany Railway Company does 
covenant and agree for itself its successors and assigns to 
and with the Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Company its suc-
cessors and assigns that it, the Richmond and Alleghany Rail-
way Company will at all times hereafter make, execute and 
deliver such further deeds of conveyance assignment or trans-
fer unto the Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Company, its 
successors and assigns as may be· necessary to fully assure 
unto the Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Company, its suc-
cessors and assig·ns the full and complete enjoyment use, pos-
session and title of, in and to the premises hereby con-
veyed or intended so to be or any part thereof and the Chesa-
peake and Ohio Railway Company does hereby assume all 
new outstanding liability (if any) of said Erwin Davis, 
Charles F. Cox and J. Kennedy Tod, under said decree en-
tered on the nineteenth day of December, 1888, in the said 
Circuit Court of the City of Richmond. 
And the Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Company does 
hereby further assume all the lawful debts and obligations 
of the Richmond a.nd Alleghany Railway Company, subject 
howev-er to the rig·ht on its part- to make any ahd all de-
fenses in law or in fact which the said Richmond and Alle-
ghany Railway Company would have ·had the right, to make 
to the same. 
In .witness whereof the Richmond and Alleghany Railway 
Company, and the Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Company 
have caused their respective corporate seals to be to be here-
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unto affixed and duly attested this twentieth day of January 
one thousand and eight hundred and ninety. 
(Seal) 
Attest: 
RICHMOND AND ALLEGHANY RAIL-
WAY CO. 
By ERWIN DAVIS, President. 
E. R. LELAND, Secretary. 
(Seal) 
Attest: 
THE CHESAPEAKE AND OHIO RAIL-
WAY CO:WIP ANY. 
By M. E. INGALLS, President. 
C. E. WELFORD, Secretary. 
page 43 ~ State of Virginia, 
City of Richmond, ss. 
. I, B. Rand W ellfor,d, a Notary Public for the City and 
State· aforesaid do certify that Erwin Davis, President of 
the Richmond and Alleghany Railway Company, whose name 
is signed to the foregoing deed dated the twentieth day of 
January, 1890, has acknowledged the same before me in my 
City aforesaid, and has further acknowledged and declared, 
that he executed the same as President of the Richmond and 
Alleghany Railway Company, and for and on behalf of said 
Company, as its act and deed, having as such president signed 
his name thereto and affixed the Corporate seal of said Com-
pany and that he caused the same to be duly attested by 
E. R. Leland, Secretary of said Company, all of 'vhich bas 
been done by him under and pursuant to the authority con-
ferred upon him by the Board of Directors of said Richmonrl 
and Alleghany Railway ·Company, I do further certify that 
E. R. Leland the Secretary of the Richmond and Alleghany 
Railway Company, whose name is signed to the deed d'ated 
the twentieth day of January, 1890, as hereinbefore referred 
to has also this day personally appeared before me in my city 
and has acknowledged the same and has declared that by di-
rection of Erwin Davis, as President of the Richmond and 
Alleghany Railway Company and under and pursuant to the 
authority conferred by the Board of Directors of the said 
Company he has duly attested the said deed and has signed 
his name to the said atestation. 
\ I 
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Given under my hand and notarial seal this twentieth day 
of January, one thousand eight hundred and ninety. 
State of Virginia, 
City of Richmond, ss. 
B. RAND WELLFORD, 
Notary Public. 
I, B. Rand Wellford, a Notary Public for the city and state 
aforesaid do certify that M. E. Ingalls, Preaident of the 
Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Company whose name is signed 
to the foregoing deed dated the twentieth day of January, 
1890, has acknowledged the same before me in my City afore-
said, and has further acknowledged and declared that he exe-
cuted the same as president of the Chesapeake and Ohio Rail-
way Company, and for and on behalf of said Company as its 
act and deed having as such President signed his name thereto 
and affixed the corporate seal of said Company and that he 
caused the same to be duly attested by C. E. Wellford, Sec-
retary of said Company, all of which has been done by him 
under and pursuant to the authority conferred upon him by 
the Board of Directors of said Chesapeake and Ohio Railway 
Company. I do further certify that C. E. Wellford the Sec-
retary of the -Ghesapeake and Ohio Railway Company, whose 
name is also signed to the deed dated the twentieth day of 
January, 1890, as hereinbefore referred to has also this day 
personally appeared before me in my City and has acknowl-
edged the same and has declar.ed that by direction of M. E. 
Ing·alls as President of the Chesapeake and Ohio 
page 44 ~Railway Company and under and pursuant to the 
authority conferred by the Board of Directors of 
the said Company he had only attested the said deed and has 
signed his name to said atestation. 
Given under my hand and notarial seal this twentieth day 
of January one thousand eight hundred and ninety. 
(Seal) 
City of Richmond, to-wit: 
B. RAND WELLFO·RD, 
Notary Public. 
In the Office of the Court of Chancery for the said City, 
the 20 day of January, 1890. 
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This deed was presented, and with the Certificates annexed, 
admitted to record at Three o'clock P. M. 
Teste: 
CHAS. W. GODDIN, Clerk. 
page 45 ~ The Demurrer referred to in the foregoing order 
is in the words and figures following, to-wit: 
The defendant says that the complainant's bill is not suf .. 
ficient in law, and assigns as grounds for its demurrer the 
following: 
1. The bill alleges no rights in the complainant which en-
title it to equitable protection, and its bill is without equity. 
2. The maintenance of the flow of water in the Lynchburg 
level of the canal having been affected with a public interest 
and having been for public benefit, the complainant did not 
and could not acquire any private rights, either by prescrip-
tion or otherwise, in the maintenance of said flow of water. 
3. ·The cQ~plainant has no right to require that the flow of 
water in said; canal be maintained, and the defendant, having 
been fully relieved by the Commonwealth, of Virginia from 
the burden and duty of maintaining the flow of water in said 
canal, under and by yirtue of the proceedings referred to in 
the bill, is under no obligation to the complainant to continue 
the flow of water therein, for the purpose of disposing of the 
sewage emptied by the compl~inant therein. 
4. Any rights which the complainant may have acquired by 
adverse user or otherwise to empty sewers into the said canal 
were acquired subject to the abandonment of the canal by and 
with the consent and authority of the Commonwealth of Vir-
ginia1 and upon the granting·of such authority by the Com-
monwealth of Virginia, by the order of November 28, 1933, 
referred to in the bill, complainant's rights aforesaid, if any 
they ever had, were extinguished. 
THE CHESAPEAI{E AND OHIO RAIL-
WAY C0~1:PANY, 
D. H. LEAKE, 
S. H. WILLIA~1:S, 
p. d. 
By Counsel. 
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And now at thi~ day, to-wit, at Lynchburg Corporation 
Court, December 9th, 1936, the date first hereinbefore men-
tioned. · 
This cause came on this day to be heard on the 
page 46 ~ bill of complaint heretofore filed by leave of Court, 
and the exhibits filed therewith; on the demurrer 
of the defendant to the said bill of complaint, together with 
the grounds thereof stated in writing, heretofore filed by like 
leave; on the joinder of the complainant in said demurrer; 
and was argued by counsel. 
On consideration whereof the Court, being fully advised in 
the premises, and having delivered its opinion under date of 
December 2, 1.936 (in the form of a letter addressed to Messrs. 
D. H. Leake, S. H. Williams, T. Justin J\'!oore, John L. Ab-
bot and T. Gibson Hobbs, which opinion and letter, together 
~ith the opinion of the Court supporting its decree of De-
cember Tern1, 1935, in the suit of John H. Heald and others 
v. Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Company, are incorporated 
herein by reference, copies of which opinions are filed in the 
papers in this cause and made a part of the record) that said 
bill of complainant is not sufficient in law and that said de-
murrer. should be· sustained and the complainant declining to 
amend its bill of complaint, but electing to stand thereon: upon 
motion of the defendant, by counsel, 
It is adjudged, ordered and decreed that the said demurrer 
be sustained and th~t said bill of complaint be, and the same 
hereby is, dismissed at the cost of the complainant. 
It is further ordered that final judgment herein be and 
it is hereby entered on behalf of the defendant. 
To all of the foregoing action of the court the complainant 
objects and excepts. 
The Opinion of the Court referred to in the foregoing order 
is in the words and figures following, to-wit: 
Lynchburg, Virginia., December 2, 1936. 
The City of Lynchburg, Complainant, 
v. 
The Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Co., Respondent. 
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Messrs.:· 
D. H. Leake, C. & 0. Ry. Co., Richmond,. Va. 
S. H. Williams, !{rise Bldg., Lynchburg, V a. 
T. Jus tin Moore, Williams, Anderson, Gay & .1\foo.re, 
Richmond, Va. 
J no. L. Abbot, Law Building, Lynchburg, Va. 
T. Gibson Hobbs, La'v Building, Lynchburg, Va. 
Gentlemen: 
Insofar as the complainant's bill in this case alleges as 
grounds for the relief prayed for therein the like grounds set 
out in the bill of J okn H. Heald and others v. The Chesapeake 
and Ohio Railway Co·mpany, the respondent's demurrer to 
the present bill will be sustained for the reasons set out in 
the opinion of this court supporting its decree of December 
19, 1935, sustaining the demurrer to the bill in the said former 
case. · 
There remains to be considered the additional ground al-
leged by the present complainant: 
"That the City of Lynchburg is entitled to have said ca-
nal, and the flow of water maintained therein at the same 
amount as existed at the time of the passage of the Act of 
February 27, 1879, or at least sufficient to carry off the sew-
age deposited in said canal by the City sewers above set 
forth.'' 
''That it acquired p~escriptive private rights to have the 
said canal maintained and to use the same as an outlet for 
its said sewers, by adverse, exclusive and continuous unin-
terrupted use, with the knowledge and acquiescence of the 
owners of said canal for said purposes for a period of more 
than twenty years.'' 
In connection with the quoted allegations should be read the 
prayer of the bill as follows: 
''That a decree be entered perpetually enjoining the Rail- 1 
way Company from closing said canal at the Lynchburg level 
or dimnishing the flow of water therein below in the canal 
at the time of the passage of the Act of February 27, 1879, 
or at least below the amount necessary to adequately carry 
off the sewage from the City's said sewers now emptying into 
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said canal; and that this court enter a binding ad-
page 48 ~ juclication of right as between your complainant 
and the said Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Com;. 
pany adjudicating and declaring the right of the City of 
Lynchburg to require the canal to be kept open by the Rail-
way Company as a perpetual outlet of said sewers, with suf-
ficient water therein to carry off the se,vage therefrom wholly 
in accordance with the foregoing allegations;'' 
The contention of the complainant City goes upon the 
theory that subsequent to the Act of 1879, the Railway Com-
pany held the canal as private property and that therefore, 
as against the Company, rights in the canal might be gotten 
by prescription. 
The law raises, after the lapse of the prescriptive period, 
the other necessary conditions obtaining, the presumption of 
a grant, and therefore confers such rights as the presumed 
grant would confer. 
Assuming for the present purpose, but not necessarily con-
ceding all of the implications that might flow from the as-
sumption, that the canal was private property, that the City 
for n1ore than the prescriptive period had emptied its sew-
ers therein under the conditions necessary ordinarily to ripen 
into a rig·ht to continue to do so upon the presumption of a 
grant, would the presumed grant be taken to extend beyond 
the ·right so to empty the sewers as long as water continued 
to flow through the canal to carry off the sewage, or should 
the presumed grant be taken to extend also to an affirmative 
obligation upon the Railway Company to keep water in the 
canal for the sole purpose of carrying off the City's sewage7 
To this last indicated result would the contention of the 
City if sustained bring the parties. . 
The bill as presented appears to claim no right of value to 
the City without the continued flow of the 'vater contended 
for. 
It is therefore more than a mere easement-a privilege of 
a dominant owner over the property of a servient owner and 
which may arise by prescription-that is claimed, 
page 49 ~ for the City would have it that without an express 
Q contract therefor it should have not merely sub-
mission to an easement but also obligatory affirmative ac-
tion in maintaining the flow of 'vater in an artificial channel 
for its benefit. 
No presumed grant is to be taken to extend that far. 
Insofar as it did not rest upon contract the duty imposed by 
the Act of 1879 to maintain the ·water supply along the Lynch-
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burg level was a duty and condition imposed by the State and 
could be relieved from by the State as it has boon through 
the State's duly constituted ag·ency, the State Corporation 
Commission authorized thereto. 
Any other right to require the respondent to keep water 
. flowing in the canal along the Lynchburg level must rest upon 
express contract and the complainant City avouches none. 
It does not appear necessary for the present purpose fur-
ther to elaborate the argument. 
Very interesting questions hav:e been presented in· the ar-
guments and briefs for both pa~ties. The many authorities 
cited have been considered but nothing has been found in them 
to outweigh the consideration stated above which appears to 
be determining here and makes it unnecessary to go further. 
It follows from what has been said that the respondent's 
demurrer to the complainant's bill will be sustained· and the 
complainant's bill dismissed. 
Cou~sel may present a decree accordingly. 
Very truly yours, 
AUBREY E. STRODE, Judge. 
I, Hubert H. Martin, Clerk of the Corporation Court of the 
City of Lynchburg, do certify that the foregoing is a true 
transcript of the record of the cause of City of Lynchburg v. ' 
Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Company, and I further certify 
that notice as required by Section 6339 of the Code of Virginia 
'vas duly given, as appears by a paper writing filed with the 
record of said cause. 
The fee for making this transcript is $15.00. 
Given under my hand this 31st day of December, 1936. 
HUBERT H. MARTIN, Clerk. 
A Copy-Teste: 
M. B. WATTS, C. C. 
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